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COMMENT

THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD:
ELIMINATING DISCRIMINATION IN THE
SCREENING OF ADOPTIVE PARENTS

I.

INTRODUCTION

Adoption creates the legal relationship of parent and child
and bestows on the adoptive parents all the rights and responsibilities of that role. 1 Adoptive parents play the same role as
biological parents in the life of their child. 2 Yet current law
allows courts and adoption agencies to treat adoptive parents
very differently from biological parents, often to the detriment
of the children they seek to adopt. While biological parents are
presumed fit to raise their children,3 adoptive parents are
screened for fitness because of an "assumed risk that adoptive
parenting won't work out."4 Many of the standards for screen-

1. JACK C. WESTMAN, CHILD ADVOCACY: NEW PROFESSIONAL ROLES FOR HELPING FAMILIES 318 (1979), calling adoption an "ancient legal process creating the
parent-child relationship." See also CAL. FAM. CODE § 8616 (West 1994), which
provides, "After adoption, the adopted child and the adoptive parents shall sustain
towards each other the legal relationship of parent and child and have all the
rights and are subject to all the duties of that relationship."
2. This comment will refer to parents who are raising their own biological
children as "biological parents" and to parents whose biological children have been
adopted by other parents as "birth parents." The role played by both adoptive and
biological parents is that of nurturing, protecting and supervising their children.
See, e.g., Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983), Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246
(1978), and Stanley v. lllinois, 405 U.S. 246 (1972), where biological fathers' involvement in caring for their children was a decisive factor in determining their
parental rights.
3. Joan Heifitz Hollinger, Adoption Law, in 3 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN 43,
47 (Richard E. Behrman, M.D., ed., 1993).
4. ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, FAMILY BONDS: ADOPTION AND THE POLITICS OF
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ing adoptive parents are arbitrary and do little more than
discourage potential parents from trying to adopt. 5
Some of these standards are more than arbitrary; they are
discriminatory.s Until recently, states not only allowed but
required agencies to screen out parents who were not the same
race as the children they wished to adopt. 7 Most states still
allow similar discrimination on the basis of the age or marital
status of potential adoptive parents. s Often, denials of adop-

PARENTING 34 (1993).
5. Hollinger, supra note 3, at 48. Such standards include race, religion, ethnicity, appearance, income level, age, marital status, and residence address of the
adopting parents. See infra part V, The Screening of Adoptive Parents.
6. The United States Constitution, state constitutions, and many federal,
state, and local laws prohibit discrimination on the basis of race. Elizabeth
Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? The Politics of Race Matching in
Adoption, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1163, 1226 (1991). These prohibitions have been
interpreted to preclude the use of race as a decision-making factor by government
agencies "not only in housing, employment, and public accommodations, but in
virtually every area of our community life." [d. at 1226, 1229. Supporting anti-discrimination laws is a "near-absolute presumption . . . that race is irrelevant to
qualifications." [d. at 1237-1238. Increasingly, state and federal laws are extending
this protection to prohibit discrimination based on other factors which are "irrelevant to qualifications" - factors such as age, disability, religion, and marital status,
which are still used to screen adoptive parents. BARTHOLET, FAMILY BONDS, supra
note 4, at 72. See infra part V, The Screening of Adoptive Parents, for a discussion of the failure of race, age, and marital status to relate to qualification to
parent. This comment will therefore refer to adoption screening criteria which
would be illegal discrimination in other areas of the law and which do not relate
to parental qualifications as discriminatory factors.
7. Hollinger, supra note 3, at 48. See also former CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 8708,
8710 (West 1994), infra part V.A., Recent Reforms. Some states still require preference for same-race adoptions. See, e.g., MINN. STATS. ANN. § 259.29 (West Supp.
1997), which, in relevant part provides:
The authorized child-placing agency shall give preference, in the absence of good cause to the contrary, to
placing the child with (a) a relative ... , (b) an important friend with whom the child has resided or has significant contact, (c) a family with the same racial or ethnic
heritage as the child, or ... (d) a family of different
racial or ethnic heritage from the child which is knowledgeable and appreciative of the child's racial or ethnic
heritage ...
If the child's birth parent or parents explicitly request that the preferences in (a), (b) or (c) not be followed, the authorized child-placing agency shall honor
that request.
[d.
8. Generally adoption statutes do not explicitly prohibit single parent adoptions or prescribe a maximum age for adopting parents. In fact, many statutes
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tive placements on these grounds result in separating a child
from the foster parent or parents who have cared for the child
for many years. 9 In many other instances, children spend
years in temporary foster homes before finding a permanent
race-matched family.lO Some children never find a family. 11
Adoption laws focus on the "best interest of the child,"12 yet
denying and delaying adoptive placements based on discriminatory factors which have little if anything to do with
parenting ability is, in reality, in nobody's best interests.

expressly provide that any single adult or married couple may adopt. See, e.g.,
WIS. STATS. ANN. § 48.82(1)(b) (West 1995). As to the age of the adopting parents,
CAL. FAM. CODE § 8601(a) (West 1994) merely requires the adoptive parents be at
least ten years older than the child. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. c. 210 § 1 (West
1987) provides that any adult may petition to adopt anyone younger than himself.
Nevertheless, such discrimination occurs. A Wisconsin court pointed out that
"Many adoption agencies have 'rules of thumb' as to the age for disqualifying
adoptive parents." In re Tachick, 210 N.W.2d 865, 870 (Wis. 1973). The same court
denied the petition of a lesbian woman to adopt her lover's child in spite of a
trial court finding that the adoption would be in the child's best interest, and in
spite of the fact that the two women were in fact already raising the child together. In re Angel Lace M., 516 N.W.2d 678, 680-681 (Wis. 1994).
9. See, e.g., Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't of Family and Children's Services, 563 F. Supp. 1200 (5th Cir. 1977); McLaughlin v. Pernsley, 693 F. Supp.
318 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
10. See infra notes 147-148.
11. Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? supra note 6, at 1188.
12. The term "best interests of the child" is the standard by which courts and
agencies are to determine decisions regarding adoption and child custody generally.
See, e.g. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.01(2) (West 1987) stating "the best interests of the
child shall always be of paramount consideration;" WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
26.33.045 (West Supp. 1997), discussing factors to consider in determining' "wheth. er a placement option is in a child's best interests"; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19 §
1129(1) (West Supp. 1997), which provides in relevant part:
The court shall grant a final decree of adoption if: ***
(E) The petitioner is a suitable adopting parent and desires to establish a parent and child relationship between
the petitioner and the adoptee.
(F) The best interests of the child are served by the adoption.
Id.
What is in the best interest of a child is often hard to define and open to
differing interpretations. One court noted, for example, "nowhere in the Children's
Code is there a definition of 'best interests of the child.' Likewise, the case law of
this state is quite barren of definite guidelines or factors which constitute the
concept of 'best interests.' " In re Tachick, 210 N.W.2d 865, 867 (Wis. 1973). That
court defined the best interests of the child this way: ''The sole issue is whether
the grandparents [who had petitioned to adopt their grandson] can provide food,
shelter, clothing, love and affection, education and training which will aid the
child to develop his full potential as a human being.» Id. at 869.
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Eliminating such standards in favor of individual assessment of parental fitness would benefit children in two important ways. First, it would allow them to be adopted more
quickly into permanent, stable homes. Second, it would prevent the unnecessary break-up of nurturing foster families. 13
Such a change would also be more consistent with the traditional protection afforded families under the Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. 14
One difficulty in reforming the system is that most of the
rules denying or delaying adoptions due to factors such as age,
race, and marital status, are not the law. Rather, they are
unwritten rules and practices of adoption agencies, which enjoy
great discretion in making adoption placement decisions. 15
The problem with the current state of adoption law is that it
allows agencies to use race as "one among many factors,"
which, in practice, means it is often the deciding factor.16
This comment will propose eliminating race and all factors
that would be discriminatory in any other area of the law from
consideration in adoption placement decisions, focusing instead
on assessments of the parenting skills of individual prospective
adoptive parents, and giving preference to foster parents or
others who are already providing care to the child. Part II will
discuss the historical precedents of today's adoption laws and
show how the misperception of the adoptive family as inferior
to the biological family helped to shape the current law. 17

13. See supra note 9.
14. U.S. CONST. amend. XN, § 1 in relevant part provides:
"No state shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Id.
Some cases challenging denials of adoptions focus on a substantive due
process liberty interest in continuing the family bonds that have formed between
children and the foster parents seeking to adopt them. See, e.g., Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 815 (1977), infra Section IV A 1. Other cases
focus instead on the Equal Protection Clause, which is implicated when adoption
denials are premised solely on the races of the prospective adoptive parents and
children. In such cases, children are harmed by delays in permanent placement
based on their race. See, e.g., In re Bridget R., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 507 (Cal. Ct. App.
1996), infra part IV.B.2.
15. See infra note 269 and accompanying text.
16. See infra note 268 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 24-69 and accompanying text.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol27/iss2/3

4

Hanan: Adoption Screening Process, Women's Law Forum

1997]

ADOPTION SCREENING PROCESS

171

Part III will describe the process of adopting a child18 to demonstrate that adoption agencies need not look to factors such
as the age, race, or marital status of parents. Part IV will show
how the current adoption screening system violates constitutionally protected family rights. 19 Part V rejects practices of
adoptions based on improper factors. 2o
Part VI21 examines recent legislation in three states
which make strides toward achieving these goalS. 22 Part VII
will recommend that states change their adoption laws to forbid courts and adoption agencies from considering discriminatory factors in placement decisions, and to offer a remedy for
violations of these standards. 23 This part will also recommend
giving a preference to prospective adoptive parents who are
already caring for the child.
II. HISTORICAL PRECEDENTS FOR MODERN ADOPTION
LAW
The notion that adoption is an inferior way to create a
family has negatively influenced the development of adoption
law. The earliest adoption laws and practices were designed to
imitate the biological family through rituals to simulate childbirth, and, in one early system, through a form of ethnic
matching. 24 The British common law system, from which most
of United States law evolved, also favored the biological family,
so much so that it did not provide for legal adoptions at all. 25
The misperception of the adoptive family as a second-best
imitation of the "real family" continues today and forms the
basis for much of the restrictive screening system. 26 Changing
societal views of race relations have shaped modern laws and

18. See infra notes 70-85 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 86-152 and accompanying text.

20. See infra notes 153-245 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 246-294 and accompanying text.
22. CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 8708-8710 (West Supp. 1996); MICH. COMPo LAws ANN.
§ 722.957 (West 1996); ME. REV. STAT. ANN., tit. 19 § 1129 (West Supp. 1997).
23. See infra notes 295-314 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 30-38 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 161-169 and accompanying text.
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practices in the area of interracial adoptions, one of the most
restrictive areas of the screening system. 27
This general overview helps to put current practices in
context by outlining the roots of adoption law. Part A discusses
the ancient adoption practices which tried to imitate the biological family.28 Part B traces the development of United
States adoption law from the informal adoptions in England
and in the colonial period to the enactment of adoption statutes in each state. Part C traces the history of interracial
adoption in the United States.

A. ANCIENT ADOPTIONS
Adoption is an "ancient legal process" which creates a
parent-child relationship.29 Four thousand years ago, this process included rituals designed to "make the adopted child the
same as if it had been born to" the adopting parents. 30 For
example, adopting mothers held their new babies under their
robes and allowed them to drop to the ground in an imitation
of childbirth. 31 Most adoptions, however, did not involve infants; in fact, adoption of adults was common,32 since the purpose of ancient adoption laws was to provide an heir for the
adopting parents. 33 Such adoptions were accomplished by ceremonies in which the adoptee pledged loyalty to his new family
and severed all ties to the old family.34

27. See infra notes 62-68 and accompanying text.
28. This comment uses the term "ancient adoptions" to refer to the Roman,
Hindu, and Mesopotamian adoption systems of two to four thousand years ago.
29. WESTMAN, supra note 1, at 318.
30. ARTHUR D. SOROSKY, ET AL., THE ADOPTION TRIANGLE 25 (1978).
31. Id.
32. Burton Z. Sokoloff, Antecedents of American Adoption, in 3 THE FuTURE OF
CHILDREN 17 (Richard E. Behrman, M.D., ed., 1993).
33. SOROSKY, supra note 3D, at 26-27.
34. Id. at 26. The modern equivalent of this practice was found in the practice, common in the middle part of this century, of sealing adoption records and
placing children in "a home unknown to the natural parents so that the relationship of the adoptive parents to the child may become one of love, affection, and
loyalty based upon the acceptance by the child of the adoptive parents as his
parents . . . " In re Tachick, 210 N.W.2d 865, 871 (Wis. 1973). See infra notes 6061 and accompanying text on the problems of sealed adoption records and the
adopted child's need to know his history.
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The purpose of these rituals was to transform the new
heirs to be "artificially blood relatives."35 Although adopted
children were entitled to inherit from their adoptive parents,36
blood relationships were central in defining "family." Adoptees
hid the fact that they were not related to their families by
blood. They could not tell anyone they were adopted or seek
out their birth parents under penalty of law. 37 Ancient Hindu
adoptions involved careful matching of caste and clan to be
sure the adoptive parents and child were as similar as possible. 38 Despite the care with which ancient adoptions simulated biological relationships, Hammurabi's Code allowed an
adoptive father to "send back" an adopted child who "transgressed.,,39 These notions of the adoptive family as an inferior
imitation of the biological family continue to shape adoption
law, in spite of evidence that the emotional bonds within families, rather than blood ties; are crucial to children's best interests!O
B. THE DEVELOPMENT OF UNITED STATES ADOPTION LAw

United States adoption law, loosely based on ancient Roman adoption law, is one of the few areas of American law not
derived from British common law. 41 Bloodlines were so important in Britain that even distant relatives were preferred over
adoptive children in inheritance, and legal adoption was not
available there until 1926. 42 An apprenticeship system provided homes and surrogate families for orphaned children.43 In
35. SOROSKY, supra note 30, at 26. The goal of the adopting parents was continuity in their family lines. 1d.
36. 1d. at 27.
37. 1d. at 25. The penalty for revealing an adoptee's background was draconian
- his tongue would be cut out. 1d.
38. SOROSKY, supra note 30, at 28. Modern adoption agencies have sometimes
followed this practice so rigidly that they have attempted to place children only
with adoptive parents whose hair and eye color and facial features were similar to
those of the children's birth parents. Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't of Family,
563 F.2d 1200, 1205 (5th Cir. 1977).
39. SOROSKY, supra note 30, at 25.
40. See JOSEPH GoLDSTEIN, ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
17 (1993), noting that children form emotional attachments to adults based upon
the nurturing and care they provide, not upon their biological or legal relationship.
41. SOROSKY, supra note 30, at 28.
42. 1d.
43. 1d. at 30.
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an apprenticeship, a child trained for a profession in the home
of an artisan.« The artisan's family provided emotional support to the child and became, in essence, the child's "second
family," though not legally recognized as such. 45
This system of artisans and their families "adopting" apprentices continued in the United States in its early years. 46
"Almshouses" provided care for orphaned babies and children
who were too young to be apprenticed. 47 During this period,
neighbors and relatives were also taking in orphaned children
and "emotionally adopting" them.4s These families wanted
laws that would give their children rights to inherit from
them.49 Meanwhile, the system of almshouses and apprenticeships, which had once alleviated the need for adoption laws by
providing homes and surrogate families for children, was becoming overwhelmed by the growing number of orphaned and
abandoned children. 50 Prior to 1851, however, there were still
no formal adoption laws. 51
Massachusetts passed the first adoption statute in the
United States in 1851 in response to these needs. 52 This statute was patterned after the adoption laws of ancient Rome,
since there was no British common law precedent for legal
adoption. 53 The Massachusetts statute added one very important innovation: it emphasized the needs of the adopted
child. 54 By 1929, all states had enacted similar laws, empha44. [d. at 29.
45. SOROSKY, supra note 30, at 29.
46. [d. at 30.
47. Sokoloff, supra note 32, at 18.
48. SOROSKY, supra note 30, at 31.
49. Sokoloff, supra note 32, at 18. At the same time, social reformers demanded protection for children caught in an often abusive system of orphan labor which
had become a part of the apprentice system. SOROSKY, supra note 30, at 32.
50. Sokoloff, supra note 32, at 17-18. Factors that contributed to the rapid
growth of homeless children were the industrial revolution, urbanization, and immigration. [d. at 19.
51. [d. at 17.
52. Mass. Stat. 1851, ch. 324 §§ 1-4 (enacted 1851), now at MAss. GEN. LAwS
ANN. c. 210 § 1 et seq. (West 1987).
53. SOROSKY, supra note 30, at 32.
54. [d. The statute protected the interests of adopted children by providing
that an adoption must be approved by a judge, and that the judge could only
approve an adoption if he were satisfied that the prospective adoptive parents
"were of 'sufficient ability to bring up the child' and that it was 'fit and proper
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sizing the best interests of the child. 55
Until the 1920's, adoption of newborn babies was extremely rare. 56 Because infant formula did not yet exist, feeding a
newborn was impossible without the help of a wetnurse. 57 Babies needing milk vastly outnumbered women able to provide
this service, so the infant mortality rate was extraordinarily
high.58 Once the invention of formula removed this obstacle,
childless couples began to see adoption as a viable way to have
the baby they had been unable to conceive. 59
The practice of sealing adoption records and keeping the
identities of birth parents and adoptive parents hidden from
each other began around the same time as the increase in
infant adoptions as a way to quickly integrate the child into
the adoptive family.60 This practice was later criticized for
ignoring the adopted child's need to know about her heritage
and have a complete sense of identity. The system, however,
recognized children's important needs to be part of the adoptive family, to have not only roofs over their heads, but "homes
in families.))61

that such adoption should take effect: " Sokoloff, supra note 32, at 18.
55. Sokoloff, supra note 32, at 2l.
56. Id. at 22.
57. Id. at 21.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 22.
60. Sokoloff, supra note 32, at 21-22. This practice was designed to help the
child fully and quickly integrate into his adoptive family. Id. at 25. In part it was
to protect against any possibility of interference in the child's life by his birth parents. In re Tachick, 210 N.W.2d 865, 870-871 (Wis. 1973). In part it was based on
the idea that the only way for an adopted child to become a part of the adoptive
family was, in essence, to pretend the child was not adopted by completely breaking any and all ties to the birth parents. See, e.g., Bartholet, Where Do Black
Children Belong? supra note 6, at 1173, noting that "the laws and policies surrounding adoption in this country have generally structured adoption in imitation
of biology, giving the adopted child a new birth certificate as if the child had been
born to the adoptive parents, sealing off the birth parents as if they had never
existed . . . " In fact, the prevailing view in the mid-twentieth century was that
the child should not be told he was adopted. In re Tachick, 210 N.W.2d at 871.
Both the sealed adoption records controversy and the possibility of maintaining
ties between birth families and adoptive families through open adoption are beyond the scope of this article.
61. Sokoloff, supra note 32, at 25.
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c.

THE HISTORY OF INTERRACIAL ADOPTIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES

Interracial adoptions were virtually unheard of until the
late 1940's.62 Almost any interracial association was virtually
unheard of at this time. 63 After World War II and the Korean
and Vietnam Wars, many American families adopted Asian
children who were left orphaned and homeless by those
wars.54 Also beginning in the 1950's and 1960's, adoptions of
children from Latin American countries by white couples became popular. 65 In the late 1960's and early 1970's, 10,000
black children were adopted by white parents. 66 At that time,
adoption agencies approved of interracial adoptions as a way of
finding homes for the large number of minority children waiting to be adopted. 67
The practice of allowing interracial adoptions changed in
1972 after the National Association of Black Social Workers
(NABSW) objected to the practice, concerned that AfricanAmerican children were not able to develop a positive selfimage or awareness of their heritage in white families. 68 The

62. Arnold R. Silverman, Outcomes of Transracial Adoption, in 3 THE FuTuRE
CHILDREN 104 (Richard E. Behrman, M.D., ed., 1993).
63. As late as the 1960's the insult used by supporters of segregation against
civil rights activists was "race-mixer." Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong?
supra note 6, at 1176. These people "saw the mixing of the races in the intimate
context of the family as the ultimate symbol of [what they saw as] the outrage
and degradation threatened by moves towards a more integrated society." Id. At
the time, interracial marriage was still illegal in many states. See infra note 178
and accompanying text. The segregationist origins of adoption race-matching are
discussed in detail by Julie C. Lythcott-Haims in Where Do Mixed Babies Belong?
Racial Classification in America and Its Implications for Transracial Adoption, 29
HARv. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 531 (1994).
64. Silverman, supra note 62, at 104-105.
65. Id. at 105. Interracial adoptions usually involve white parents or interracial couples with one white parent. See infra note 197.
66. Silverman, supra note 62, at 105.
67. Id. Among the factors leading to this trend included an increasing need for
homes for minority children and a growing acceptance of racial integration in
general. Kim Forde-Mazrui, Note, Black Identity and Child Placement: The Best
Interests of Black and Biracial Children, 92 MICH. L. REV. 925, n. 3 (1994).
68. Silverman, supra note 62, at 105-106. Ways of dealing with these valid
concerns other than denying interracial adoptions will be discussed in Section V.B.,
Screening on the Basis of Race, and Section VII, Recommendations to Improve the
Screening System. Opposition to interracial adoption is not based entirely on conOF
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NABSW has not changed its position, but the laws that once
stood in the way of interracial adoptions have recently begun
to change. 69
III. THE CURRENT ADOPTION PROCESS IN THE UNITED
STATES
There are two basic types of adoptions. In agency adoptions, a state agency or department or a private, state-licensed
adoption agency matches children with prospective adoptive
parents. 70 An independent adoption, on the other hand, is arranged directly between the birth parents and adoptive parents. 71 Significantly, the screening criteria used in agency
adoptions generally do not apply in independent adoptions. 72
For this reason, many birth parents who voluntarily give up
their babies for adoption choose independent adoption.73 Private adoption agencies are also less likely than public state
agencies to focus on race and other discriminatory screening
cern for the welfare of interracially adopted children. The NABSW, for example,
calls interracial adoption "cultural genocide," and opposes it fearing interracial
adoption might have adverse effects on preservation of culture for the AfricanAmerican commUnity as a whole. Preservation of minority cultures is a laudable
goal, but when the NABSW and other opponents of interracial adoption advocate
leaving minority children in foster care with no permanent home, they advance
this goal at the expense of those children. Julie C. Lythcott-Haims, Note, Where
Do Mixed Babies Belong? Racial Classification in America and Its Implications for
Transracial Adoption, 29 HARv. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 531, 551 (1994). Interestingly,
there is far less opposition to interracial adoption of children from foreign countries. Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? supra note 6, at 1175. For a
discussion of the race-matching scheme's failure to enhance and protect AfricanAmerican culture, see Kim Forde-Mazrui, Note, Black Identity and Child Placement: the Best Interests of Black and Biracial Children, 92 MICH. L. REv. 925
(1994).
69. See infra note 246.
70. Mark McDermott, The Case for Independent Adoption, in 3 THE FuTuRE OF
CHILDREN 147, 150 (Richard E. Behrman, M.D., ed., 1993).
71. Bryce J. Christensen, Two Cheers for Independent Adoption, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 3, 1987, available in WESTLAW, WSJ Database. Often a lawyer or other
intermediary introduces the two sets of parents. Id.
72. See BARTHOLET, FAMILY BONDS, supra note 4, noting that prospective adoptive parents can avoid the screening system through independent adoption. Id.
73. Bryce J. Christensen, Two Cheers for Independent Adoption, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 3, 1987, available in WESTLAW, WSJ Database. Birth parents choose independent adoption to avoid temporary foster care placement of their babies while
agencies wait for adoptive families who meet the screening criteria. Id. Another
reason birth parents choose independent adoption is to avoid procedural delays
often involved in agency adoptions. Id.
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factors; as a result, many minority birth parents choose private
rather than public agencies. 74 Of course, not all children
placed for adoption are newborn babies voluntarily relinquished by their birth parents; many children are placed for
adoption after a court has terminated the parental rights of
their abusive or neglectful parents. 75 These birth parents do
not have any say in what kind of screening process determines
who will adopt their children. 76 Their children are the ones
most adversely affected by the current agency screening system. 77
Once prospective parents find a child to adopt, they must
file a petition for adoption with a COurt. 78 All states require
some form of home study to determine the prospective adoptive
parents' fitness as parents and whether they are the best parents to raise the individual child they want to adopt.79 The
qualities adoption agency workers look for in potential adoptive parents are maturity, sensitivity to human needs, and
tolerance towards the unmarried birth parents of their adoptive children. so The ways in which the parents deal with cri-

74. Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? supra note 6, at 1234, noting
that many African-American birth parents choose private adoption agencies over
public agencies because many such agencies place a higher priority on immediately
finding adoptive homes than on race-matching, unlike public agencies.
75. Hollinger, supra note 3, at 45. Additionally, some birth parents relinquish
custody of their children to state agencies when threatened with involuntary termination proceedings. [d.
76. Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? supra note 6, at 1234, n. 203.
77. Most healthy black babies available for adoption do find homes, while older
minority children do not. [d. at 1203. In part, this is because many agencies that
race-match also actively recruit black families. [d. Such agencies are able to find
homes for these babies. [d. Minority children free for adoption after termination of
parental rights, however, wait for years for permanent families. [d. at 1203-04.
This comment will focus on agency adoptions because that is where the
screening factors cause the most harm. Independent adoption is mentioned only as
a basis for comparison, to show that the screening factors are unnecessary.
78. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 8802 (West 1994) provides in relevant part:
[A] person with whom a child has been placed for adoption, who desires to adopt
a child may, for ,that purpose, file a petition in the county in which the petitioner
resides. [d.
79. McDermott, supra note 70, at 150. Generally, in independent adoption, the
home study serves only to determine parental fitness. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE §
8807 (West 1994) (adoption agency or county department must investigate the prospective adoptive parents within 180 days of birth parents giving their consent
and report findings to the court).
80. LINDA CANNON BURGESS, THE ART OF ADOPTION 3, 11, 15 (1977). Burgess
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ses, the stability of their marriage, and their relationships with
friends and family are also important. 8t Agencies consider the
prospective adoptive parents' finances to be an important consideration, but find that ability to manage money is more significant than income leve1. 82 One of the most important considerations is the prospective parents' motivation to adopt.83 If
the parents want a child to solve problems that having a child
simply will not solve, they may not be suitable parents. 84 Similarly, if the parents are committed to their decision to adopt
they will be better parents to an adopted child than parents
who are not completely sure this is the way they want to add a
child to their family.85 In spite of birth parents' preference for
an adoption process which does not focus on discriminatory
factors, and in spite of the elaborate process already in place to
assess parental ability on an individual basis, agencies continue to deny adoptions based on these factors.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF THE FAMILY
Not only are screening criteria based on race, age, marital
status, and similar factors unnecessary and harmful to children by delaying and denying adoptions, they are constitutionally suspect. United States Supreme Court decisions have
interpreted the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to provide constitutional protection for family relationships.86 Although the biological link between parents and chil-

is a former adoption agency director.
81. Id. at 3, 12.
82. Id. at 12. See also In re B.L.S., 901 S.W.2d 38 (Ark. Ct. App. 1995). The
trial court found an adoption by the child's aunt, who had cared for her since she
was a newborn baby, was not in the child's best interest, in large part because
the aunt was on disability and received Aid to Families with Dependant Children
benefits. Id. at 39-40. The appellate court reversed, noting that the aunt's income,
low as it was, was enough to meet her expenses. Id. at 40.
83. BURGESS, supra note 80, at 12-13.
84. Id. at 12.
85. Id. at 13, 15.
86. Such protection stems from the Supreme Court's decision that family relationships are "within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees." Griswold v. Connecticut 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965). See, e.g.,
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (marriage is a fundamental right); Loving
v. Virginia 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (right to choose marriage partner); Griswold v. Connecticut 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right of married couple to decide to use contraceptives so they would not have children); Skinner v. Oklahoma 316 U.S. 535 (1942)
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dren is often the focus of cases which deal with the protection
of their relationships, it is not the only basis for such protection. s7 Because of the many non-biological bases for constitutional protection of family relationships, the author will demonstrate how the same constitutional protection may be extended to the relationships between children and the potential
adoptive parents who have already cared for them. Furthermore, children may also have fundamental liberty interests in
a stable home and in preserving their emotional bonds with
the people who take care of them.ss

A. PARENTAL RIGHTS ARE BASED ONLY IN PART ON THE BIOLOGICAL LINK

Many cases dealing with the protection of the family deal
with families related biologically.s9 Biology alone, however, is
not the only basis for constitutional protection of families in
general, and the relationship of parents and children, in particular. gO Other bases include the emotional bonds between family members and the assumption that parents will act in their
children's best interests.

(procreation is a fundamental right); Pierce v. Society of Sisters 268 U.S. 510
(1925) and Meyer v. Nebraska 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (right to make decisions regarding children's education).
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is also relevant
in cases involving race-matching, because in such cases, agencies treat prospective
adoptive parents and children waiting for homes differently on the basis of their
race. See supra note 14. See infra notes 136-150 and accompanying text, discussing
In re Bridget R. 49 Cal. Rptr. 507 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996), an Equal Protection challenge to a race-matching scheme.
87. These include the emotional bonds between family members, and the importance of parents in protecting their children's interests. See infra Section IV.A.
for a discussion of cases focusing on these bases.
88. Although the United States Supreme Court has not decided whether children have a constitutionally-protected interest in their relationships with their
parents, Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 130 (1988), California courts do
recognize that children have rights to a stable family and to protection and care.
In re Jasmon 0., 878 P.2d 1297, 1307 (Cal. 1994). .
89. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431
U.S. 816, 843 (1977) (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972), which
called the rights to "conceive and raise one's children" essential).
90. Smith, 431 U.S. at 843-844.
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1. Emotional Bonds as a Reason to Protect Family Relationships
The family is important enough in society to merit constitutional protection in part because of the importance to individuals of the emotional bonds that develop in "the intimacy of
daily association, and from the role [the family] plays in 'promoting a way of life' through the instruction of children. »91 In
Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, the United States
Supreme Court considered whether foster families should be
afforded the same type of protection to which biological families are entitled. 92 Although the Court ultimately did not decide this issue,93 Justice Brennan, writing the plurality opinion of the Court, indicated that foster families may indeed be
entitled to some constitutional protection, at least in the case
of long-term placements where the foster family is the child's
de facto family.94 Justice Brennan reasoned that the emotional attachments that develop in such families are just as strong
91. [d. at 844 (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 231-233 (1972».
92. [d. at 818-820. In Smith, foster parents challenged the state's power to
remove children from their homes. Some of the children involved were being
moved to other foster homes, others were to be reunited with their biological parents. [d. at 818-819, n. 1. These foster parents were not seeking to adopt the
children in their care, whose biological parents still had parental rights. [d. Smith
is nevertheless relevant to the issue of the adoption screening system since adoption agencies often ignore the relationships that develop within long-term foster
families, focusing instead on the races of the parents and' child and on other discriminatory factors.
93. [d. at 847. The Court did not need to decide this issue, instead holding
that a New York law allowing social services departments to remove children from
foster homes at its discretion did not violate any liberty interest the foster families may have because it afforded them a fair opportunity to contest the planned
removals - in other words, it afforded them due process of law before the children
were removed from their homes. [d. at 856. Despite this narrow ground for upholding the foster care laws, Justice Brennan "took great pains to analyze the
assertion of the foster parents and foster children that they had a constitutionallyprotected liberty interest. A careful reading of the opinion indicates . . . that but
for the narrower ground . . . the Court would readily have determined that such
[a] constitutionally protected liberty interest did exist." Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't of Family and Children's Services, 563 F.2d 1200, 1213 (5th Cir. 1977)
(Tuttle, J., dissenting). The Drummond majority, however, held that children do
not have a liberty interest in their relationships with potential adoptive/foster
parents, relying primarily on Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976), which held
that an adult prisoner had no liberty interest in a stable environment which
would preclude transfer to another prison. Drummond, 536 F.2d at 1208-1209.
94. Smith, 431 U.S. at 844-45. "We cannot dismiss the foster family as a mere
collection of unrelated individuals." [d.
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as those that develop in families related by blood. 95
Nevertheless, Justice Brennan found reasons for any parental rights for foster parents to be weaker than those of
biological parents. For one thing, foster care is meant to be
temporary.96 Furthermore, foster parents provide care to children over whom a state agency has legal custody through a
contractual relationship with that agency.97 The foster family
relationship is one in which "the State has been a partner from
the outset."9S Finally, placement of the child in foster care,
unlike adoption, does not terminate all the rights of the biological parent to the child. 99 Thus, the biological parents still
have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in protecting
their relationship with the child, which conflicts with the foster
parents' interests. 100
The reasons Justice Brennan found for limiting the parental rights of foster parents only make sense, however, when
foster parents seek to block the return of foster children to
their biological parents. When foster parents seek to adopt a
child who has been in their care for a long time, the foster care
arrangement, while intended to be temporary, has, in reality,
become indefinite.101 The relationships within a such a foster
family is thus more like the relationships within biological
families which are protected. If the biological parents' rights
have been terminated, there is no longer a competing interest
to protect. The reasoning of the plurality opinion indicates that
given a proper case, the Supreme Court might very well hold
that a child and her foster parents have a constitutionally
95. Before analyzing the legal issues involved, Justice Brennan described in
detail the realities of New York's foster care system, pointing out that although
foster care is meant to be a temporary substitute for care by biological parents
who are unable to care for the child, children often stay in foster care for many
years. Id. at 833, 836. Many foster children have little or no contact with their
biological parents. Id. at 836, n. 39. Where a child remains in one foster family
for a long time and has no contact with his biological parents, "it is natural," as
Justice Brennan pointed out, "that the foster family should hold the same place in
the emotional life of the child ... as the natural family." Id. at 844.
96. Smith, 431 U.S. at 834.
97. Id. at 826-27.
98. Id. at 845.
99. Id. at 827.
100. Id. at 846.
101. See supra note 95.
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protected interest in protecting their "family-like association,"
free from "arbitrary government interference."lo2
2. Parental Responsibility for the Child's Well-Being as a
Basis for Parental Rights

Parental rights are protected, both constitutionally and by
state statutes, based in part on the assumption that parents
will act to protect their children's best interests. The California
Court of Appeals for the Second District discussed this basis
for familial rights in In re Bridget R. 103 The United States
Supreme Court discussed this basis in Quilloin v. Walcott. 104
These two decisions demonstrate that the responsibility parents assume in caring for their children can play a central role
in the prote,ction of parental rights.
The Bridget R. court noted that under California law,
"children are not merely chattels belonging to their parents,
but have fundamental interests of their own. Such fundamental interests are of constitutional dimension."lo5 The court
noted that United States Supreme Court cases recognizing
constitutional protection for parental rights have done so at
least in part based on the notion that "children's needs generally are best met by helping parents achieve their interests."106 In Lehr v. Robertson, for instance, the Supreme
Court noted that "the rights of parents are a counterpart of the
responsibilities they have assumed."lo7

102. Smith, 431 U.S. at 846. See also Drummond, 563 F.2d at 1212-1214
(Tuttle, J., dissenting), noting that Justice Brennan could have chosen to uphold
the New York law based on the adequate opportunity it provided foster parents to
challenge the removals of children without analyzing the potential rights of foster
families. Judge Tuttle suggested that Justice Brennan intentionally devoted several
pages of dicta to discussing the possible familial rights of foster families. Id.
103. In re Bridget R., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 507 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
104. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1977).
105. In re Bridget R., 49 Cal. Rptr. 507, 514 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (citing In re
Jasmon 0., 878 P.2d 1297, 1307 (Cal. 1994)). These rights include the right to be
protected from abuse and neglect and a right to a secure and stable home ([d. at
524, citing In re Jasmon 0., 878 P.2d at 1307), and will be discussed in more
detail in the next section.
106. Bridget R., 49 Cal. Rptr. at 524 (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745,
759-761 (1982) and Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 649 (1972)).
107. Id. (citing Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 257 (1983)).
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In Quilloin v. Walcott, the United States Supreme Court
demonstrated this principle when it considered the responsibility an unwed biological father had taken for his child's care in
determining his parental rights. lOS The father, Leon Quilloin,
who had established a relationship with his son, wanted to
block the adoption of the eleven-year-old boy by his step-father.l09 Georgia law required the consent of both parents of a
child born during a marriage to the child's adoption, but required only the consent of the mother if the parents were not
wed when the child was conceived. 110 Mr. Quilloin challenged
this distinction on equal protection grounds.1ll Georgia's statutes, he claimed, denied to him a right they granted to ma,rried
or divorced fathers with no adequate basis for the distinction. 112 The Court, however, found adequate grounds for the
distinction in the fact that Mr. Quilloin, unlike a married or
divorced father, had "never exercised actual or legal custody
over his child, and thus [had] never shouldered any significant
responsibility with respect to the daily supervision, education,
protection, or care of the child." 113 Thus, the individual
father's role in protecting his child's interest was significant
enough to affect his rights regarding his child.
Since the responsibility parents have for protecting their
children's interests does not depend upon a biological relationship, neither should the rights that go with it.114 Foster parents seeking to adopt assume this same responsibility as soon
as they begin to care for the child. Other prospective adoptive
parents actively seek this responsibility when they submit
themselves to the adoption screening process. In doing so,
these parents demonstrate their commitment to fulfilling the
parental responsibilities emphasized by the courts as a basis
for parental rights.115 This basis for parental rights should

108. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1977).
109. Id. at 247.
110. Id. at 248.
111. Id. at 252.
112. Id.
113. Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 256.
114. Id. at 525. This principle was recognized by the California Supreme Court
in In re Michael R., 898 P.2d 891, 899 (Cal. 1995), and by the United States Supreme Court in Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. at 261.
115. In seeking to adopt, prospective adoptive parents demonstrate not only a
desire to parent, but a strong commitment to do so. Adoptive parents must find a
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thus apply to potential adoptive parents in exactly the same
way it applies to biological parents.
B. THE RIGHT OF CHILDREN TO STABLE FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS
California courts recognize that children have their own
fundamental rights in family relationships. The California
Supreme Court discussed and applied this principle in In re
Jasmon 0. 116 Two years later, the California Court of Appeals for the Second District discussed the possible constitutional foundations for familial rights for children in In re
Bridget R.ll7 These cases show that California courts consider
the importance of stable, pennanent relationships for children
in detennining familial rights.
1.

In re Jasmon O.

In In re Jasmon 0., the California Supreme Court discussed the familial rights of children when it decided that a
family court had not violated a father's constitutional rights by
tenninating his parental rights to his seven-and-a-half-year-old
daughter. us The child, Jasmon, had been placed in foster
care at the age of six months because neither parent was able
to care for her.u9 The mother's rights were tenninated earlier, but the father made a major transfonnation in his life,
child to adopt, and must be approved as adoptive parents both by a social worker
conducting a home study and by a court. See supra notes 72-87 and accompanying
text. Finding a child can take three to seven years, at least for parents looking
for an infant. Review and Outlook (Editorial): The Adoption Option, WALL ST. J.,
July 7, 1989, available in WESTLAW, WSJ Database. The home study process can
be very intrusive on the privacy of the prospective adoptive parents, and also very
time-consuming. BARTHOLET, FAMILY BONDS, supra note 4, at 33-34. Elizabeth
Bartholet, a leading adoption expert, states: "I would be prepared to assume that
those who push forward to pursue adoption under these circumstances will, as a
general matter, be at least as committed and fit a parent group as non-adoptive
parents, many of whom fall into parenting without any conscious choice whatsoever. Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? supra note 6, at 1207.
116. In re Jasmon 0., 878 P.2d 1297 (Cal. 1994).
117. In re Bridget R., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 507 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
118. In re Jasmon 0., 878 P.2d 1297 (Cal. 1994).
119. Id. at 1300. The baby's father had a drug problem. Id. The mother was a
sixteen-year-old girl living in a halfway house for mentally ill patients. Id. at
1314. The young birth mother voluntarily placed Jasmon in foster care and did
not contest termination of her parental rights. [d. at 1300.
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recovering from drug addiction and maintaining visitation with
J asmon. 120 The trial court did not find that the father was
unfit to parent any child,121 but nevertheless found that it
was in Jasmon's best interests to allow her foster parents to
adopt her rather than to disrupt her bond with them.122 Her
father was not able to establish a close relationship with his
child or to understand her anxiety at the prospect of losing her
relationship with the foster parents who had cared for her
since infancy.123 The court found that he was therefore unable to meet Jasmon's needs. 124
In deciding that termination of Jasmon's father's parental
rights did not violate his constitutional interest in preserving
their relationship, the court discussed Jasmon's rights. The
court noted that children, like their parents, have fundamental
rights, including the right to be protected from neglect and the
right to a stable and permanent home. 125 These interests
sometimes conflict with the interests of parents. 126 When that
happens, the child's rights and the parents' must be balanced. 127 Thus, at least according to California courts, protecting a child's family relationships is not only in that child's
best interests, it is within the child's fundamental rights. 128

120. Id. at 1300.
121. Jasmon 0., 878 P.2d at 1310. Justice Mosk, however, writing for the California Supreme Court, pointed out that the trial court "discounted the evidence
that the father was incapable of acting as an adequate parent to any child . . . ."
Id.
122. Id. at 1304.
123. Jasmon 0., 878 P.2d at 1300.
124. Id. at 1310.
125. Id. at 1307.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Although both Jasmon O. and In re Bridget R., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 507 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1996), infra notes 129-146 and accompanying text, deal with protecting
the bonds a child has already formed with adoptive parents or potential adoptive
foster parents, allowing children to form bonds with a permanent family as early
as possible is just as much a requirement of a right to a stable and permanent
home as protecting such bonds once they are formed. See infra notes 148, 185.
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In re Bridget R.

More recently, in In re Bridget R., a California appellate
court examined the holdings of some United States Supreme
Court cases and concluded that these fundamental rights of
children are protected not only by California courts, but also by
the United States Constitution. 129 The Bridget R. court noted
that the United States Supreme Court has referred to the
relationship between parent and child as being constitutionally
protected. 130 Supreme Court decisions have based a parent's
fundamental rights in part on the parent's role in protecting
the child's fundamental rights. 131 The Bridget R. court reasoned that children's familial rights may be even more fundamental than the rights of their parents. 132 Children's interests include .not only preservation of an emotional bond, but
also the "elementary ... needs of the small and helpless to be
protected from harm and to have stable and permanent homes
in which each child's mind and character can grow, unhampered by uncertainty and fear of what the next ... court appearance may bring.,,133 The current screening system violates this right to the extent that it removes children from
stable placements with potential adoptive parents who are fit
parents but do not meet the screening criteria.
C. THE IMPACT OF THE CURRENT SCREENING SYSTEM ON FAMILIAL RIGHTS

The rights of children to stable family relationships is
undermined by a system which delays and denies adoptions
based on factors having nothing to do with parental fitness. 134 The factual setting of In re Bridget R. demonstrates
how one screening factor, race, can operate to deny children

129. In re Bridget R., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 507, 514, 524 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
130. Id. at 524 (citing Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. at 255) (emphasis added in
Bridget R.).
131. Bridget R., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 524 (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S.
at 759-61, Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. at 649, and Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. at
257).
132. Bridget R., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 524.
133. Id.
134. See infra notes 145-150 and accompanying text.
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their right to stable family relationships. Other screening factors can have a similar effect. 135
In Bridget R., the California Court of Appeals for the Second District considered the effects on these fundamental rights
of children when the Indian Child Welfare Act is applied to
Native American children adopted by non-Indian parents. 136
Birth parents who were both partially of Native American
descent consented to the adoption of their twin baby girls because they were unable to support them financially.137 Later
the birth father attempted to withdraw his consent to the
adoption. 138 His consent to the adoption was valid under California Family Code Section 8700, but not under the ICWA. 139
The court held that the ICWA is only constitutional if limited
to the "existing Indian family" doctrine. 14O The otherwise
compelling governmental interest in preserving Native American culture 141 is simply not served by blocking an adoption if
the birth parents have no significant contacts with a tribe and
its culture. 142 Thus, applying the ICWA to children like
Bridget and Lucy, the twins in this case, whose parents have
no significant contact with any Indian tribe, treats them differ-

135. See infra notes 226-227 and accompanying text.
136. The Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) is codified at 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 1901-23
and 1931-63. Bridget R., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 519. It gives Indian tribes the jurisdiction and funding to handle most of the child custody cases involving children
who are members of a tribe. [d. The ICWA provides that for a consent by the
birth parents to the adoption of a Native American child to be valid, it must be:
1) executed in writing, and 2) recorded in front of a judge 3) more than 10 days
after the child is born. [d. at 515. The ICWA is unique in adoption law because it
is based in part on a desire to preserve Native American culture and in part on
the sovereignty of Indian tribes. [d. at 528.
The requirements for birth parent consent to an adoption under California
state law are less stringent. The California Family Code provides that the birth
parent or parents may effectively consent to adoption "by a written statement
signed before two subscribing witnesses and acknowledged by an authorized official
of the department or agency." CAL. FAM. CODE § 8700(a) (West 1994).
137. Bridget R., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 517.
138. [d. at 507.
139. [d. at 515.
140. [d. at 529. The "existing Indian family doctrine" limits application of the
ICWA to cases where the child's birth parents are involved in a tribe and its
culture and applies state adoption laws to children of Native American descent
who would not have this kind of contact if raised by their assimilated birth parents. [d. at 520.
141. Bridget R., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 526.
142. [d. at 529.
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ently from other children waiting to be adopted based only on
their "genetic heritage - in other words, race. "143
This difference in treatment is in fewer available adoptive homes and a
greater risk that their placement with adoptive families may
be disrupted, as happened to Bridget and Lucy.l44 Such different treatment, based only on their race, violated both the
twins' right to equal protection of the laws,145 and their due
process interest in their relationship with their adoptive parents. l46
Like the twin girls in In re Bridget R., many minority
children wait far longer for homes than white children do. 147
This has two detrimental effects. Some children bounce around
in foster care never finding a stable family.l46 Other children
do find a stable foster family placement, only to have the bonds
they form with such families severed when adoption agencies

143. Id. at 527.
144. Id.
145. Bridget R., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 529.
The ICWA requires Indian children who cannot be cared
for by their natural parents to be treated differently from
non-Indian children in the same situation. As a result of
this disparate treatment, the number and variety of adoptive homes that are potentially available to an Indian
child are more limited than those available to non-Indian
children, and an Indian child who has been placed in an
adoptive or potential adoptive home has a greater risk
than do non-Indian children of being taken from that
home and placed with strangers.
Id. at 528.
146. Id. at 529.
147. The average wait for all children in foster care to be adopted is two and
one-half years, but for minority children the average wait is five years. Albert R.
Hunt, Politics and People: Metzenbaum Breaches the Adoption Color Barrier, WALL
ST. J., July 14, 1994, available in WESTLAW, WSJ Database. This is in spite of
the fact that many parents seeking to adopt do not specify a racial preference for
their child. Review and Outlook (Editorial): The Adoption Option, WALL ST. J.,
July 7, 1989, available in WESTLAW, WSJ Database.
148. One study in Missouri showed that one third of the children in that state's
foster care system had been in four or more foster homes in less than five years.
Bryce J. Christensen, Two Cheers for Independent Adoption, WALL ST. J., Dec. 3,
1987, available in WESTLAW, WSJ Database. See also the discussion of New
York's foster care system in Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality
and Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 833-38 (1977), supra note 95. Approximately 60% of the
children in foster care in New York City at that time had experienced more than
one foster care placement. Approximately 28% of these children had been in three
or more foster homes. Id. at 837.
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choose instead to place them with strangers who are the same
race as the children or who more nearly match the agency's
profile of what an adoptive parent should look like in other
ways.149 Preventing these detrimental effects is so essential
to the well-being of children that the Bridget R. court held that
parental screening procedures which contribute to these harms
violate children's fundamental rights. 150 If, as the Bridget R.
opinion indicates, children have a constitutional right to stability and continuity of familial relationships, the current adoption screening system violates that right. 151 Similarly, if potential adoptive foster families have a constitutionally protected interest in maintaining their family bonds, as the plurality
opinion in Smith v. Organization of Foster Families and the
Supreme Court's analysis of parental rights in Quilloin v.
Walcott indicate they do, the current screening system is unconstitutionaL 152

149. The emotional impact on children can be devastating. Bryce J. Christensen,
Two Cheers for Independent Adoption, WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 1987, available in
WESTLAW, WSJ Database. In In re Jasmon 0., 878 P.2d 1297, 1305 (Cal. 1994),
for example, the child developed a psychological separation anxiety disorder when
faced with the prospect of being separated from the foster parents who had raised
her since she was a baby. In McLaughlin v. Pernsley, 693 F. Supp. 318, 327 (E.D.
Pa. 1988), affd, 876 F.2d 308 (3d Cir. 1989), a child became severely depressed as
a result of being separated from the family who had cared for him since he was
an infant.
150. In In re Bridget R., the court held that race-matching violated the twins'
constitutional rights unless there was a compelling interest to justify it. See supra
notes 140-146 and accompanying text. The court remanded the case to determine
whether the twins' birth father did have significant contacts with a tribe which
would further the compelling interest in preserving Native American culture. In re
Bridget R., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 507, 530 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996). The appeals court instructed the trial court that even if it finds the birth father does have such contacts, it must then determine whether returning the girls to their birth father is
in their best interests. Id. at 533. The reach of the ICWA, even where its application may promote a compelling interest in preserving Native American culture, "is
limited by the twins' interest in having a stable and secure home." Id. The appeals court considered the twins' interests in stability and continuity at least as
compelling as any interest that might support race-matching, if not more so. The
court stated, "we believe it would constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to remove a child from a stable placement . . . without a hearing to determine whether the child would suffer harm if
removed from that placement." Id.
151. See supra notes 129-133 and accompanying text.
152. See supra notes 91-115 and accompanying text.
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V. THE SCREENING OF ADOPTIVE PARENTS USING
DISCRIMINATORY CRITERIA
The primary problem with the screening process is that it
does not simply ensure the adoptive parents' basic fitness as
parents, but instead imposes arbitrary standards that fail to
protect the child. 153 For example, agencies screen potential
adoptive parents on the basis of race, religion, age, marital
status,l54 and even place of residence. 155 The screening system tries to emulate the biological family through racial
matching and a preference for married couples in their twenties or early thirties. 156 These criteria fail to serve the best
interests of the children they are intended to protect, and in
fact harm those children by delaying adoptions and removing
them from stable families. 157 Recent changes in the laws governing screening of parents on the basis of race may point the
way to a better way of screening in all areas. 158
Part A will discuss the screening system as an attempt to
duplicate the physical appearance of biological families in
adoption. Part B will discuss and reject the reasons for screening on the basis of race. One reason for race-matching is past
segregation. 159 Other reasons are mistaken assumptions that
only same-race parents can give minority children a positive

153. McDermott, supra note 70, at 147. See also, BARTHOLET, FAMILY BONDS,
supra note 4, at 70, noting "the absence of any evidence that screening succeeds
in identifying superior parents." Accord, Hollinger, supra note 3, at 48.
154. Such distinctions in any other area of the law would be impermissible
discrimination. BARTHOLET, FAMILY BONDS, supra note 4, at 72. See supra note 6.
155. McDermott, supra note 70, at 147.
156. BARTHOLET, FAMILY BONDS, supra note 4, at 72. "Older parents are often
precluded from adopting children more than thirty-five or forty years younger than
themselves on the ground that they would not have been likely to produce such
children themselves." [d.
157. The disparate impact this has on minority children was discussed supra
part IV.B., Children's Right to a Stable Home, as was the devastating impact the
instability can have on individual children. Examples of the emotional damage to
children cause by race-based removals from foster parents or other care-givers can
be found in the cases discussed throughout this comment. For this reason, Part V
will not deal with the harms of the screening system in detail, but will instead
focus on the flaws in the reasoning which supports the system.
158. See infra Part VI, Recent Reforms.
159. See infra notes 176-185 and accompanying text.
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image of themselves and their race, and teach them how to
cope with the racism they will encounter in society.16o Part B
will then explore the unique problems faced by multiracial
children in the adoption placement context and by mixed-race
couples seeking to adopt. Part C will examine at screening on
the basis of age, marital status, and other discriminatory factors.

A. SCREENING TO EMULATE THE BIOLOGICAL FAMILY
The screening system is, in many ways, little more than
an attempt to make the adoptive family physically resemble
the biological family.161 Until the late 1950's, adoption agencies matched parents with children who were physically and
intellectually "as close a match as possible to the biological
children they might have produced. "162 The ideal was for
adopted children to look enough like their adoptive parents
that no one would realize they were adopted. 163 These practices were based on a belief that physical similarities would
allow the child to bond more easily with her adoptive family.lM The reality of bonding within families that look quite
unlike biological families proves this old assumption
wrong. 165
Nevertheless, the goal of physically replicating the biological family continues to influence the screening system, particu-

160. See infra notes 188-212 and accompanying text.
161. Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? supra note 6, at 1173, stating
that the "implicit goal has been to create an adoptive family which will resemble
as much as possible 'the real thing' - the 'natural' or biological family that it is
not."
162. Id. at 1176.
163. BURGESS, supra note 80, at 14. During this period, the prevailing notion
was that the children themselves should not know they were adopted. In re Adoption of Tachick, 210 N.W.2d 865, 871 (Wis. 1973).
164. Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? supra note 6, at 1176.
165. See, e.g., Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? supra note 6, at
1171, where Bartholet, the single adoptive mother of two Peruvian Indian children,
says of her older son, "This child is as inside my skin as any child could be." See
also, Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't of Family and Children's Services, 563
F.2d 1200 5th Cir. 1977), and McLaughlin v. Pernsley, 693 F. Supp. 318 (E.D. Pa.
1988), where interracial foster families shared parent-child bonds; and In re M.D.,
Jr., 653 A.2d 873 (D.C. Ct. App. 1995), where a single foster mother shared parent-child bonds with the foster son she sought to adopt.
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larly through the use of screening factors such as the race and
age of adopting parents. l66 The National Association of Black
Social Workers, in its position paper against interracial adoption, considered the physical differences between an MricanAmerican adopted child and his family a crucial deterrent to
the child's sense of identity.167 Where multiracial children are
placed for adoption, social workers typically choose the race of
the family with which they will place such a child based on the
child's appearance. l68 Similarly, in cases where the adopting
parents' age is a factor, courts explicitly compare the age of the
adopting parents to the age of typical biological parents. 169
Such factors have nothing to do with parenting ability; the
myth that adoptive families cannot form bonds unless they
look like biological families is simply not true. Children form
deep emotional bonds based on their parents' efforts to satisfy
their physical needs and their needs for attention and affection. 170 Parents need not look like biological parents to fulfill
this function in their child's life.l7l
B. SCREENING ON THE BASIS OF RACE
Until recently, all states allowed racial matching; some
states even required it.172 In California, a child could only be

166. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
167. Forde-Mazrui, supra note 67, at 956 (citing NATIONAL AsSOCIATION OF
BLACK SOCIAL WORKERS, POSITION ON TRANSRACIAL ADOPTION (1973». "There is no
chance of his resembling any relative. One's physical identity . . . is significant."
Id.
168. See Lythcott-Haims, supra note 68, at 553 (citing Ellen Hopkins, The Color
Line, in MIRABELLA, May, 1990), noting that social workers decide which race to
label a multiracial child based on the child's skin tone and other physical characteristics. If the child looks multiracial, the social workers will most likely label her
as her minority race. Id. See infra Section VI.B.1. for a discussion of the racist
origins of this method of labelling. See also Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't of
Family and Children's Services, 563 F.2d 1200, 1204 (5th Cir. 1977), where the
petition of white foster parents to adopt their biracial foster child (whose birth
mother was white) was denied because "agency employees were also aware that as
Timmy grew he would retain the characteristics of his black father."
169. See, e.g., In re Tachick, 210 N.W.2d 865, 870 (Wis. 1973) ("larger age difference than the normal age difference between the natural parents and their children"); and Child v. Stangler, No. 92-0850-CV-W-6, 1992 WL 396318, *2 (W.D. Mo.
Dec. 28, 1992) ("age . . . similar to. that of a biological grandparent").
170. GoLDSTEIN, supra note 40, at 17.
171. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
172. Hollinger, supra note 3, at 48.
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placed in an interracial family after the agency showed that it
had made a "diligent search" for a family the same race as the
child, but that after ninety days (three months) that search
proved futile. 173 This preference for racially homogenous families often resulted in separating the child from a foster parent
or parents who had successfully raised that child for more than
a year. 174 In recent years, however, many states have amended their laws to eliminate racial matching altogether or to
prohibit agencies from categorically denying adoptions based
on the race of the parents or child. 175
1.

The Segregationist Origin of Race-Matching

At one time, this society was predominantly racially segregated. 176 When the United States Supreme Court decided in
1967 that laws banning interracial marriages were unconstitutional,177 sixteen states still had such laws on their books. 178
This desire to keep families segregated has had two major
effects on the adoption race-matching scheme. One effect is a
belief that integrated families are simply not "natural," and
thus not in children's best interests. 179 For example, in ruling
that it was appropriate to remove a multiracial child from his
white foster parents, one court said that "it is a natural thing
for children to be raised by parents of their own ethnic background. 180 An earlier and more blatantly racist example of
the use of race in child placement decisions was Ward v. Ward,
in which the Washington Supreme Court upheld a trial court

173. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8708(b) & (c) (West 1994). The "diligent search" was to
include appeals in the media for same race parents. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8710 (West
1994). These sections were repealed in 1995. A.B. 1743, Cal. Leg., 1995-1996 Sess.
(1995).
174. See, e.g, Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't of Family and Children's Services, 563 F. Supp. 1200 (5th Cir. 1977); McLaughlin v. Pernsley, 693 F. Supp.
318 (E.D. Pa. 1988), affd 876 F.2d 308 (3d Cir. 1989); Child v. Stangler, 1992 WL
396318 (W.D. Mo. 1992). See generally Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong?
supra note 6, at 1191-93.
175. See infra note 246.
176. See supra note 63.
177. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
178. Lythcott-Haims, supra note 68, at 536, n: 34.
179. Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? supra note 6, at 1241.
180. Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't of Family & Children's Services, 563
F.2d 1200, 1205 (5th Cir. 1977).
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order awarding custody of the daughters of a divorcing black
father and white mother to their father because it was best if
the girls stayed "among their own people."181

Ward also illustrated the other impact of segregation on
the adoption screening system: the practice of defining the
children of interracial unions as black and only black. 182 In
fact, children with any trace of African ancestry are considered
black, and must wait for a "same-race" family to adopt them
even if white or interracial couples are available immediately.l83 These children are classified in this manner because of
an old racist notion that even "one drop" of non-white blood
"contaminates" a multiracial person's "pure" white blood so
that the person cannot possibly be labelled white. l84 While
the agency waits to find a "same-race" home, the child may be
bounced around from one foster home to another.185 These old

181. Ward v. Ward, 216 P.2d 755, 756 (Wash. 1950). The court considered the
girls, who were both black and white, to be only black. This custody dispute between biological parents is relevant as an illustration of the way race plays an
often illogical role in decisions that are supposed to be based on the individual
.
child's best interests.
182. Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? supra note 6, at 1175 and n.
14. The same method decides how adoption agencies will label multiracial children
who are partially white and partially Asian or Hispanic.
183. [d. See, e.g., Compos v. McKeithen, 341 F. Supp. 264 (E.D. La. 1972), in
which an interracial couple seeking to adopt and a white couple who wished to
adopt a black child successfully challenged Louisiana's absolute prohibition on
interracial adoption. The interracial couple, the Normans, could not adopt any
child since the law provided that "A single person over the age of twenty-one
years, or a married couple jointly, may petition to adopt a child of his or their
race." [d. The adoption agency told them that as an interracial couple they simply
could not adopt. [d. at 265.
184. Lythcott-Haims, supra note 68, at 538 (citing Neil Gotanda, A Critique of
"Our Constitution is Color-Blind, n 44 STAN. L. REv. I, 34 (1991)). The extreme
distastefulness of this form of racism is one of the reasons that the author proposes to remove such a notion from the adoption screening process.
185. See supra note 148. Even if the four or five foster families all provide
excellent care, this means repeatedly forming bonds only to have them tom apart
by the next transfer. As a result, children who are not placed early for adoption
have difficulty ever forming permanent family bonds. Studies show that early
permanent placement is the most important factor in the healthy emotional development of adopted children. Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? supra
note 6, at 1224 (citing W. FEIGELMAN & A. SILVERMAN, CHOSEN CHILDREN: NEW
PATTERNS OF ADOPTIVE RELATIONSHIPS 93 (1983». This study specifically compared
the effects of interracial adoptions with the effects of delaying placement and
found the latter to be more harmful. Multiracial children face the additional problems of classification, which will be discussed in part BA.
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notions of racially homogenized families harm minority and
multiracial children who need permanent homes as soon as
possible.
Were remnants of segregationist institutions the only
reason the restrictive race-matching scheme is still in place, it
would be far easier to reject this system. Adoption professionals, however, express concerns over the ability of white parents
to meet the needs of minority and multiracial children. 186
These needs include the child's sense of racial identity and
self-esteem and the ability to cope with racism, including negative reactions to the child's interracial family.187
2.

The Child's Racial Identity and Self-Esteem

One reason for the opposition to interracial adoption is a
concern that minority children raised in white or mixed-race
homes will lose their cultural identity.188 Studies show, however, that most adopted children in interracial families have a
sense of identity and cultural heritage. 189 The strength of this
sense of identity depends on the adoptive parents' efforts to
foster it.190 Such efforts might include buying books, toys, and
records that teach about the child's ethnic culture, and spending time with other people of the child's background or backgrounds. 191 Living in an integrated neighborhood and making
186. Arguments in favor of race-matching lose whatever force they otherwise
might have when one considers the unwillingness of agencies to place multiracial
children with parents of one of that child's races or any multiracial or minority
children with interracial couples. See infra part N.B.4. for some outrageous results
of race-matching in action in this context.
187. See infra notes 188-212 and accompanying text.
188. Forde-Mazrui, supra note 67, at 926 (citing NATIONAL AsSOCIATION OF
BLACK SOCIAL WORKERS, POSITION ON TRANSRACIAL ADOPTION (1973)). "Black children in white homes are cut off from the healthy development of themselves as
black people . . . . " Id.
189. Silverman, supra -note 62, at 104. One study, by the Institute of Mental
Health, found that teenagers who had been adopted as young children were just
as mentally healthy as teenagers who had been raised by their biological parents,
and that interracially-adopted teens were equally well-adjusted, and had a strong
sense of racial identity. Albert R. Hunt, Politics and People: Metzenbaum Breaches
the Adoption Color Barrier, WALL ST. J., July 14, 1994, available in WESTLAW,
WSJ Database.
190. Silverman, supra note 62, at 104. Accord Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? supra note 6, at 1220.
191. Forde-Mazrui, supra note 67, at 948, n. 141 (citing Margaret Howard,
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sure the child attends a racially-diverse school also help to give
the child a sense of racial identity.192 Studies show that seventy-five percent of interracially adopted children adjust well
in their adoptive families and have the same levels of selfesteem as other children. 193 For about half of the children
who do not do well in interracial adoptions, factors other than
the mixed-race family are to blame, such as delays in permanent placement or traumatic experiences early in life. 194
The only significant difference between interracial and
same-race adoptions is a difference in how the children perceive themselves racially as they grow Up.195 Most minority
children adopted by white families identify with both the white
community and the minority community.196 As a result, many
black children adopted by white parents 197 see themselves as
white, mixed-race, or simply "human.,,198 Only thirty percent
identified themselves as black. l99 One analysis of interracial
adoptions distinguished between two aspects of racial identity:
having a positive image of one's race, and strongly identifying
with its cultural heritage and no other cultures. 2oo The former, but not the latter, is crucial to the child's self-esteem.201
While interracially adopted black children tend to identify less

Transracial Adoption: Analysis of the Best Interests Standard, 59 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 503, 539 (1984)).
192. Silvennan, supra note 62, at 110, noting that children in interracial adoptive families who live in integrated neighborhoods and attend racially integrated
schools and churches have a stronger sense of racial identity than those who do
not.
193. Id. at 109-110.
194. Id. at 108. One study found age at the time of placement in the adoptive
family to be the most crucial factor in the success of interracial adoptions. Id. at
115. Accord Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? supra note 6, at 1224.
195. Silvennan, supra note 62, at 110.
196. Id. at 117.
197. Interracial adoptions involve white and interracially married parents almost
exclusively. One study found only four placements of white children with black
parents. Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? supra note 6, at 1175, n.12
(citing DAWN DAY, THE ADOPTION OF BLACK CHILDREN: COUNTERACTING INSTITUTIONAL DISCRIMINATION (1979)).
198. Silvennan, supra note 62, at 110.
199. Id. It should be noted that the majority of "interracially" adopted children
in fact are biracial or multiracial children with one white birth parent who are
adopted by white parents. Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? supra note
6, at 1175, n.14.
200. Forde-Mazrui, supra note 67, at 947.
201. Id.
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strongly with their race and no other than do black children
adopted by black parents, their image of their ''blackness'' is
just as positive. 202 Parents' attitudes towards their child's racial heritage and identity have a strong impact on how the
child sees herself, regardless of the color of the parents'
skin. 203
Living in a multiracial family can provide unique advantages such as a sense of belonging in more than one culture,
and more tolerance towards differences than might be gained
growing up in a racially homogenous family.204 The
interracially-adopted child may enjoy the richness of more than
one culture, just as many interracially adopting parents take
joy in learning about and participating in their children's cultural heritage. 205 Given the different levels of success among
parents of all races in instilling in their children a positive
racial identity, it simply makes more sense to assess all parents, regardless of race, based on their individual willingness
and ability to do SO.206
202. [d. Although the article focused on the problems of black and biracial
(black/white) children in the adoption system, there is no reason to assume the
results would be different in any other interracial adoptions.
203. Silverman, supra note 62, at 108, noting that for the small number of
interracially adopted children who do have identity problems, the failure of their
parents to acknowledge their racial background was a factor in causing their confusion.
204. Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? supra note 6, at 1221-1222.
Bal,1;holet refers to an informal study conducted by Dr. Alvin Poussaint. [d. at
1221, n.158. Dr. Poussaint, hoping to disprove the once-prevailing attitude that
interracial marriages had a negative impact on the children of such marriages,
interviewed adult children of one white and one black parent. [d. He asked about
what they perceived to be the advantages and disadvantages of growing up in an
interracial family. [d. They usually emphasized the positive aspects. [d. They saw
being a part of two cultures as an advantage, and said that they felt less intimidated by racism than other black or biracial people who had not grown up with
parents of both races. [d. They claimed that they stood out as different in social
situations in ways that were both positive and negative. [d. Bartholet did not cite
to a published study; she received this information in a telephone interview with
Dr. Poussaint. [d. at n. 158
205. See, e.g., Joan Mahoney, The Black Baby Doll: Transracial Adoption and
Cultural Preservation, 59 U.M.KC. L. REV. 487, 500 (1991). After discussing her
plans to give her multiracial baby daughter a sense of the baby's black cultural
heritage, Mahoney states that the whole family will benefit from these cultural
experiences as much as the baby will.
206. Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? supra note 6, at 1220, noting
that not all minority parents successfully foster a sense of racial" identity in their
children. See also Mahoney, supra note 205, at 498, noting that many black fami-
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The Child's Ability to Cope with Racism

Proponents of race-matching further contend that only
minority parents can teach minority children the skills they
need to cope with the racism they are likely to encounter sometime during their lives. 207 This argument initially seems to
make sense, since minority adoptive parents have experienced
racism themselves while white adoptive parents have not. For
the reasons that follow, however, white parents should be able
to give their minority and multiracial children the skills they
need to overcome racism.
For one thing, the argument that only racial minorities
have experienced any form of prejudice simply is not true.
White parents are themselves members of various ethnic
groups. One does not have to think too hard to recall ethnic
slurs and stereotypes for each of the European immigrant
groups that make up the white "majority." Although this sort
of prejudice hardly compares to the institutionalized discrimination encountered by many racial minorities,208 encountering it can be no less hurtful than the kind of racist attitudes
minority children are likely to encounter nowadays.209 Furthermore, as members of mixed-race families, white adoptive
parents may themselves become the objects of racial prejudice,
and must learn how to cope along with their children. 210
lies live in predominantly white neighborhoods and send their children to nearly
all-white schools. In McLaughlin v. Pernsley, 693 F. Supp. 318, 324 (E.D. 1988),
the court heard evidence that many black couples were not able to provide adequate foster care to black children. In In re Bridget R., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 507 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1996), the appellate court directed the trial court to consider on remand
whether the children's birth father would instill in them a sense of Native American culture and identity. See supra note 150.
207. Forde-Mazrui, supra note 67, at 926 (citing NATIONAL AsSOCIATION OF
BLACK SOCIAL WORKERS, POSITION ON TRANSRACIAL ADOPTION (1973». "Black children are taught, from a very early age, highly sophisticated coping techniques to
deal with racist practices . . . Only a Black family can transmit the emotional and
sensitive subtleties of perception and reaction essential for a Black child's survival
in a racist society." Id.
208. Simple insults pale in comparison to the slavery and segregation endured
by African-Americans or the internment camps endured by Japanese Americans.
209. One writer suggests that white parents in interracial families teach their
children to cope with racial insults with the techniques they themselves learned to
use to cope with any other insults, ethnically or racially motivated or not. FordeMazrui, supra note 67, at 954.
210. Id. See also Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? supra note 6, at
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Most importantly, white parents are as able as any other
parents to give their children a positive sense of themselves
racially and individually.211 This ability, coupled with their
own condemnation of racist views, is one of the strongest tools
for fighting racism parents can impart to their children. 212
4. The Unique Problems of Multiracial Children and Interracial Couples

The policy of race-matching makes even less sense now,
when multiracial children make up a significant percentage of
the children waiting for adoptive families, and interracial marriages are becoming more and more common.213 The screening system ignores this reality.214 For multiracial children,
the common practice of classifying them (and waiting families)

1170-71. Bartholet discusses her heightened understanding of racism after adopting
a brown-skinned Peruvian Indian baby boy. "I listen with new ears to a familiar
discussion of affirmative action . . . I . . . learn something of the problems that
children of color face as they advance into the older grades at the local school
that my biological child had attended." [d.
211. See supra notes 188-206 and accompanying text.
212. Forde-Mazrui, supra note 67, at 954-955.
213. Minority children make up 46% of the children in foster care waiting for
adoptive homes. Lythcott-Haims, supra note 68, at 552, n.111. Of these children,
many are in fact multiracial children classified as only one of their races. Statistics show that children born to parents of different races increased from 1% of the
total number of babies born in 1968 to 3.4% of the total in 1989. [d. at 531, n. 4.
These statistics probably underestimate the true number since the parents themselves tend to be classified as only one race, for example on census surveys. [d.
(citing to statistics of the Population Reference Bureau). In fact, the majority of
people classified as African-American, Latino, Filipino, and Native American are
really multiracial, as are a significant, though smaller, percentage of people identified as white. Lythcott-Haims, supra note 68, at 544 (citing Maria P.P. Root, Within, Between, and Beyond Race, in RACIALLY MIXED PEOPLE IN AMERICA 3, 9 (Maria
P.P. Root ed., 1992».
In 1991, there were over 200,000 black/white interracially-married couples in
the United States. Lythcott-Haims, supra note 68, at 536-537 (citing Lynell
Beorge, Cross Colors, L.A. TIMES, March 27, 1994). There are no accurate statistics
that show how many of these couples seek to adopt. Bartholet, Where Do Black
Children Belong? supra note 6, at 1166, n. 4. The documented cases of those who
try to adopt demonstrate the difficulties they face in an adoption system which
favors racially-homogenous families. See, e.g., Compos v. McKeithen 341 F. Supp.
264 (E.D. La. 1972), supra note 183.
214. Agencies typically classify children as members of one and only one race.
See supra notes 182-184 and accompanying text. They use the same method for
classifying potential adoptive families. See infra notes 219-221 and accompanying
text.
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as one race and only one race leads to further difficulties in
finding a match.215 Furthermore, this failure to take into account their complete racial heritage denies them the benefits of
cultural preservation and racial identity that proponents say
justify the race-matching system. 216
The logical inconsistency of classifying multiracial children
as belonging to a single race and trying to match them with a
family of that race is demonstrated by the following hypothetical suggested by one writer on the placement of multiracial
children:
Where should the child of an Asian woman and
a Latino man be placed? Can she go to either a
Latino family or an Asian family because she
shares [racial characteristics] with both? Can
she go to any multiracial family because she is
multiracial? Or can she find no home unless a
family with her exact racial lineage is located?217

Such a child most likely would be labelled either as Latino or
Asian and would wait for a home until the agency finds a racially homogenous family of whichever race the adoption workers choose for the child.218 What this child really needs, of
course, is a family that will love and nurture her as soon as
possible, a need which is jeopardized by the existing adoption
system.
Making race-based placement decisions becomes even more
complicated when adoption agencies classify multiracial families the same way they classify children: by choosing one and
only one race. For example, a brown-skinned child whose birth
mother is white and whose birth father is unknown was classified as black, while his foster family, a white mother and Mrican-American father, were classified as white. 219 Consequent-

215. This unrealistic classification approach adds to the placement delays minority children endure. See infra notes 219-221 and accompanying text.
216. See infra notes 222-225 and accompanying text.
217. Lythcott-Haims, supra note 68, at 532.
218. See infra notes 219-221 and accompanying text.
219. Lythcott-Haims, supra note 68, at 555 (citing Thorwald Esbeusen, Children
Need Homes, Not Ethnic Politics, in CRISIS, Nov.-Dec. 1992, at 21).
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ly, the child was "a candidate for removal" from his foster
home in favor of a "same-race" placement. 22o An MricanAmerican woman and her white husband were surprised to
discover that an adoption agency would give them "very low
priority" to adopt a multiracial child because, according to the
agency, they were not a close enough racial match to such a
child. 221 It is difficult to imagine a closer racial match to a
multiracial child than an interracial couple representing two of
the child's races. This demonstrates the logical inconsistency of
applying single-race labels to children and families who are of
many races and trying to match them based on inaccurate
labels.
Another problem with applying single-race labels to multiracial children and families in race-matching is that it hampers the multiracial child's ability to develop a sense of his
true and complete racial identity.222 A biracial child, for example, who identifies himself as both black and white does so
because he is both. 223 Forcing a single-race label upon a child
who is in fact multiracial can actually cause the child to suffer
low self-esteem because the single-race label only represents
half of who the child is.224 If cultural preservation is in the
child's best interests, then preserving both or all a multiracial
child's cultural heritages is in that child's best interests. 225
After all, such a child really is a member of more than one
race.

c.

SCREENING ON THE BASIS OF AGE, MARITAL STATUS, AND
OTHER DISCRIMINATORY FACTORS

Race-matching, while the primary factor responsible for
delaying adoptions and undermining the stable placements of

220. Id.
221. Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? supra note 6, at 1187, n. 60.
222. See generally, Lythcott-Haims, supra note 68.
223. Forde-Mazrui, supra note 69, at 956 (citing Philip M. Brown, Biracial Identity and Social Marginality, in 7 CHILD AND ADOLESCENT SOCIAL WORK 319, 325
(1990».
224. Lythcott-Haims, supra note 68, at 555, n.127 (citing PAUL R. SPICKARD,
MIXED BLOOD: INTERMARRIAGE AND ETHNIC IDENTITY IN TwENTIETH-CENTURY
AMERICA 339 (1989». Accord, Forde-Mazrui, supra note 67, at 956-57.
225. Forde-Mazrui, supra note 67, at 956.
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children in potential adoptive families, is not the only factor
having that effect. For example, available same-race parents
may be denied the opportunity to adopt a waiting child because they are single. 226 Screening factors, such as marital
status and age, like race, do little to predict the adoptive
parent's ability to raise a child. 227Yet adoption agencies regularly apply these factors as they strive for a preconceived image of what a family should be. 228 In doing so, the agencies
actually deprive many children of early placement in good
homes.
Although it is common for children to be raised by only
one biological parent, "'as late as 1969 a respected adoption
expert found it necessary to defend single parent adoption as
'not inherently or necessarily pathogenic.',,229 Most single
adoptive parents are women,230 although single men adopt
children as well. 231 These parents are more willing than most
adoptive parents to adopt older children, who are harder to
place than babies. 232 Their marital status has little if any impact on the successful development of their adopted chil-

226. One little boy in Philadelphia waited six years for a permanent home
while the agency responsible for placing him rejected first two potential adoptive
parents who were single and then several couples who were not the same race as
the child. After six· years, the agency took him ofT its list of children available for
adoption because he was unable to bond with a permanent family after years of
moving from foster home to foster home. Lythcott-Haims, supra note 68, at 553-54
(citing William Raspberry, Hurdles Slow Adoption of Black Children, TIMES-HERALD RECORD, December 29, 1990, at 36).
227. Although this comment focuses on race, age, and marital status as 'parental screening factors, these are by no means the only discriminatory factors used
to prevent fit parents from adopting. See, e.g., In re B.L.S., 901 S.W.2d 38 (Ark.
Ct. App. 1995), supra note 82 (income and marital status were factors in denial of
adoption), and In re Carney, 157 Cal. Rptr. 383 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979) (father's
physical disability was an important factor in trial court awarding custody to the
mother).
228. See supra notes 161-171 and accompanying text.
229. BARTHOLET, FAMILY BONDS, supra note 4, at 7l.
230. Kathy S. Stolley, Statistics on Adoption in the United States, in 3 THE
FuTuRE OF CHILDREN 26, 37 (Richard E. Behrman, M.D., ed., 1993).
231. BURGESS, supra note 80, at 125.
232. Stolley, supra note 230, at 37. "Older" hard-to-place children are those over
two years old. BURGESS, supra note 80, at 125. It should be noted, however, that
one reason single parents are so open to adopting older children is that because
agencies prefer married couples, single parents realize that babies will go to married adoptive parents first. Id.
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dren. 233 The single adoptive parent's extended family is very
important for the adopted child, for "it is there that the child
will find his surrogate father or mother."234 Agencies placing
children with single parents can and do consider the single
adoptive parent's extended family relationships to decide
whether placing a child in a particular family is in the child's
best interest. 235
Adoption agencies prefer parents in their twenties or early
thirties, in part because this is the age at which they believe
most biological parents are likely to have children. 236 In In re
Adoption of Tachick, the Wisconsin Supreme Court considered
the argument that the adoption of a three-year-old child by his
biological grandparents was not in his best interests because of
their age. 237 Mrs. Shehow, the child's grandmother, was fiftythree years old and Mr. Shehow, the grandfather, was fiftynine years old. 238 Both had possible health problems. 239 The
county agency opposing the adoption argued that, due to their
age, the Shehows would be likely to die while the little boy
was still young, which would be traumatic for him.240 The
Wisconsin Supreme Court considered this argument unpersuasive, pointing out, "we have no assurance that if the child were
to be adopted by younger people that they would live to a ripe
old age."241
Furthermore, concerns over the longevity of "older" par233. Stolley, supra note 230, at 37.
234. BURGESS, supra note 80, at 125.
235. Id.
236. See supra note 156 and accompanying text and note 169 and accompanying
text.
237. In re Tachick 210 N.W.2d 865, 870 (Wis. 1973). Other issues in the case.
included the fact that only one of the grandparents' eight biological children had
fInished high school, a concern that the birth father of the child would become the
child's legal brother if the grandparents were allowed to adopt, and concerns over
the grandparents' health. Id. at 869, 870.
238. Id. at 869-870.
239. Id. Doctors suspected Mrs. Shehow suffered from high blood pressure and
that Mr. Shehow was diabetic, but they had not yet been diagnosed as such at
the time of trial. Id.
240. Id. at 871. The Shehows would be ages 74 and 68 when the child reached
the age of 18. One might question whether, in the absence of their possible health
problems, there would be any justillcation for the agency's concern about their
longevity.
241. Id.
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ents make even less sense in the context of adoptive parents in
their late thirties or early forties, who also rank lower in the
adoption screening system. 242 Ironically, the added maturity
and the financial and emotional security of these "older" parents are the very characteristics that give them the ability to
provide for their children and to develop an exceptionally good
relationship with them. 243
The use of discriminatory factors in the screening of adoptive parents does little to advance the best interests of children. Such factors do not tell adoption agencies or courts
much, if anything, about the individual parent's ability to raise
a child. 244 More importantly, the use' of these factors often
causes delays in permanent placement, particularly for minority children, or results in separating children from prospective
adoptive parents who are already raising them. 245 The only
way to adequately protect children's best interests is to completely eliminate these screening factors and focus instead on
the individual parents' ability to nurture and support the child.

VI. RECENT REFORMS
Recent reforms in some states address these problems, but
do not go far enough. For example, reforms in many states
make interracial adoptions easier.246 These reforms are bene-

242. BARTHOLET, FAMILY BONDS, supra note 4, at 70.
243. Paul R. Ackennan, Creating a Family: The Adoption Option, in IB CURRENT PERSPECTIVES IN PSYCHOLOGICAL, LEGAL AND ETHICAL ISSUES: CHILDREN AND
FAMILIES: CREATION AND CONFLICT 81, 85 (Sandra Anderson Garcia and Robert
Batey eds., 1991).
244. See supra parts V.B.2. and V.B.3., for a discussion of the failure of race as
a factor to predict parental ability, for example.
245. See supra notes 147-149 and note 174 and accompanying text.
246. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-105.01(A) (West Supp. 1996) (enacted
1995) (an adoption agency or court "shall not deny or delay a placement or an
adoption certification based on the race, the color, or the national origin of the
adoptive parent or child"); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1129 (West Supp. 1997),
(amended 1995) (adoption may not be denied solely because the parents and child
do not share the same race or national origin); MICH. COMPo LAws ANN. § 722.957
(West Supp. 1996), (enacted 1994), prohibits discrimination against prospective
adoptive parents on the basis of race, age, religion, disability or income level.
Minnesota still has a preferences-in-adoptive-placement scheme similar to the one
California recently abandoned (relatives are considered first, then same-race families, then other families), but MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.29 (West Supp. 1997)
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ticial in that they may shorten the waiting period for minority
children awaiting adoptions.247 Thus the laws serve to advance the ''best interests of the child" and protect the possible
constitutional familial rights of children waiting to be adopted.
The reforms, however, with few exceptions, do not address
discriminatory screening factors other than race, nor do they
completely eliminate any of these factors from consideration. 248 The unfortunate effect is to leave open the possibility that adoptions will continue to be delayed and denied
based primarily, if not entirely, on factors that have nothing to
do with parenting ability.249
This section examines recent reforms in California,250
Michigan,251 and Maine. 252 The new laws in Maine and
California prohibit discrimination against prospective adoptive
parents on the basis of race and national origin, and also require that courts and adoption agencies take into account any
emotional bonds the child has formed with a foster family in
making placement decisions. 253 The new Michigan statute
prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability, income level,

(amended 1993) was amended to require "due, not sole, consideration" be given to
a child's race in choosing an adoptive home. The words "not sole" were added. [d.
California now prohibits discrimination on the basis of race or national origin in
adoptions. See, CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 8708-8710 (West Supp. 1996) (enacted 1995).
247. California repealed its mandatory waiting period of three months before
adoption agencies could even consider available non-same-race families. See infra
note 256. The adoption refonn statutes in many states prohibit delaying adoptions
on the basis of race. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-105.01(A) (West Supp.
1996), supra note 246; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.33.045 (West Supp. 1997)
(adoption shall not be delayed or denied on the basis of race). Maine law directly
recognizes the importance of providing "the adoptee a pennanent home at the
earliest possible date" in meeting the standard of the child's best interests. ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19 § 1129(2) (West Supp. 1997).
248. See infra notes 261-275 and accompanying text and notes 290-294 and
accompanying text.
249. See infra note 268 and accompanying text.
250. CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 8708, 8709, & 8710 (West Supp. 1996).
251. MICH. COMPo LAws ANN. § 722.957 (West Supp. 1996).
252. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19 § 1129(1) & (2) (West Supp. 1997).
253. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19 § 1129(1)(E) & (F), and § 1129(2), CAL. FAM.
CODE §§ 8708, 8790, and 8710 (West Supp. 1996). The Maine statute, while not
expressly mentioning foster parents, mandates consideration of the child's bonds
with various adults in her life in deciding whether the adoption is in the "best
interests of the child." The California law requires that foster parents be considered along with other prospective adoptive parents in certain circumstances.
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and age, as well as race. 2M This section concludes that while
these reforms are an improvement over a scheme which requires preferences for same-race families, they leave open the
possibility that race and other discriminatory factors will still
be used to deny and delay adoptions.

A. CALIFORNIA: AsSESSING THE INDIVIDUAL PARENT'S ABILITY
TO MEET THE CHILD'S NEEDS AND CONSIDERING EXISTING P ARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIPS

1. Assessing the Individual Parent's Ability to Meet the
Needs of a Child for Cultural Identity
California made a dramatic change in the Family Code in
1995. 255 Prior to this amendment, California Family Code
Section 8708 required that a diligent effort be made to place
the child with either a relative or with adoptive parents the
same race as the child before an interracial family could even
be considered. 256 The new California Family Code Section
254. MICH. COMPo LAws ANN. § 722.957 (West Supp. 1996).
255. A.B. 1743, Cal. Leg., 1995-1996 Sess. (1995).
256. Prior to the refonns, CAL. FAM. CODE § 8708 (West 1994) (repealed 1995)
provided in part:
[Tlhe following order of placement preferences . . . shall
be used . . . in determining the placement of the child:
(a) In the home of a relative.
(b) If a relative is not available, or if placement with a
relative is not in the child's best interest, with an adoptive family with the same racial background or ethnic
identification as the child. If the child is of mixed racial
or ethnic background, placement shall be made with a
family of the racial or ethnic group with which the child
has the more significant contacts.
(c) If placement cannot be made under the rules set forth
in this section within 90 days of the time the child is
relinquished for adoption . . . the child is free for adoption with a family of a different racial background or
ethnic identification where there is evidence of sensitivity
to the child's race, ethnicity, and culture. The child's
religious background shall also be considered in determining an appropriate placement. Unless it can be documented that a diligent search . . . for a family meeting the
placement criteria has been made, a child may not be
placed for adoption with a family of a different racial
background or ethnic identification pursuant to this subdivision.
[d. (emphasis added).
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8708 forbids discrimination against either adoptive parents or
children on the basis of race or national origin. 257 Family
Code Section 8709, enacted with the new Section 8708, provides that courts may consider the child's race and religion and
the adopting parents' ability to "meet the needs of a child of
this background" in determining whether the adoption is in the
child's best interest. 258 The statute does not say whether
courts should, or even may, consider the race of the adoptive
parents in determining their capacity to meet the child's cultural needs. 259
The "diligent search" was to be carefully documented and include efforts to
recruit same-race families in the media. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8710 (West 1994) (repealed 1995). Section 8709 did, however, allow adoption agencies to place a child
without following the placement preference scheme of Section 8708 if they could
show "good cause" to do so. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8709 (West 1994) (repealed 1995).
257. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8708 (West Supp. 1996) provides:
Neither the department nor a licensed adoption agency to
which a child has been freed for adoption by either relinquishment or termination of parental rights may do either
of the following:
(a) Categorically deny to any person the opportunity to
become an adoptive parent, solely on the basis of the
race, color, or national origin of the adoptive parent or
child involved.
(b) Delay or deny the placement of a child for adoption,
or otherwise discriminate in making an adoption placement decision, solely on the basis of the race, color, or
national origin of the adoptive parent or child involved.
[d.
258. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8709 (West Supp. 1996) (emphasis added).
259. [d. Maine has a similar statute which, like the California statute, does not
tell whether courts and agencies may consider the parents' race as well as the
child's. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19 § 1129(2) provides in part:
In determining the best interests of the adoptee, the court
shall consider and evaluate the following factors to give
the adoptee a permanent home at the earliest possible
date:
*** (B) The capacity and disposition of the adopting person or persons, the birth parent or birth parents or the
putative father to educate and give the adoptee love,
affection, and guidance and to meet the needs of the
adoptee, taking into account the adoptee's cultural, ethnic,
or racial background. An adoption may not be delayed or
denied solely because the adoptive parent and the child
do not share the same race, color, or national origin.
[d. The last sentence was added in 1995. [d.
Because these laws are so new, there are no appellate cases yet that interpret the statute's mandate to consider the parents' ability to meet the child's cultural needs. See infra part VII. B. , discussing how such an assessment might be
made without regard to the adoptive parents' race.
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The new statutes are an improvement over California's
previous preference scheme in that they do not require a waiting period before a multiracial family may even be considered. 260 The new laws, however, may not go far enough because they do not explicitly prohibit racial matching in adoption placement decisions. 261 The statutes no longer require
race to be a factor in decisions, but neither do they prohibit it.
The problem with this is that it allows agencies to continue
their current practices. 262
That is exactly what happened when Connecticut made a
similar change in its adoption laws. 263 Connecticut amended
its adoption laws in 1986 to prohibit denials of adoptions for
foster children "solely on the basis of a difference in race" between the child and potential adoptive parents. 264 The task

260. A three-month waiting period was actually required under former CAL.
FAM. CODE § 8708(c) (West 1994) (repealed 1995), supra note 256.
261. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8709 (West Supp. 1996) provides in relevant part:
The department or licensed adoption agency. . . may
consider the cultural, ethnic, or racial background of the
child and the capacity of the prospective adoptive parent
to meet the needs of a child of this background as one of
a number of factors used to determine the best interests
of the child.
[d. The statute does not say whether the parents' race may enter into such a
determination. See infra part VII.B for a discussion of how such an assessment
night be made without regard to the race of the adopting parent or parents.
262. A Senate bill sponsored by Senators Howard Metzenbaum and Carol
Mosely-Braun would deny federal funding to any adoption agency which delays or
denies adoptions based solely on race. Some adoption experts criticize the bill
saying it does not go far enough and will allow race-matching to continue as' long
as race is not the only factor in denying an adoption. Albert R. Hunt, People and
Politics; Metzenbaum Breaches the Adoption Color Barner, WALL ST. J., July 14,
1994, available in WESTLAW, WSJ Database. See infra Section VII, which recommends strengthening statutes such as these by expressly prohibiting consideration
of the adoptive parents' race in making placement decisions.
263. Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? supra note 6, at 1185, n. 56.
264. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-726 (West, 1996), previously at CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 45-611, provides:
If the commissioner of children and youth services is
appointed as statutory parent for any child free for adoption . . . said commissioner shall not refuse to place such
child with any prospective adoptive parent solely on the
basis of a difference in race.
[d.
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-727(c)(3) (West 1996) provides that courts
may not disapprove any other adoption solely because of a difference in race, color, or religion. [d.
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force appointed to implement the new law, however, proposed
practices promoting a preference for same-race placement. 265
California's new law is very similar to Connecticut's in that it
prohibits consideration of race as the sole factor in adoption
placement decisions, without explicitly prohibiting an agency
preference for race-matched families. 266 If anything, the California statute does more than the Connecticut statute to encourage consideration of race as a factor, since it expressly
permits the child's race to be a factor in making a determination of the child's best interests. 267 When the law allows race
to be a factor in adoption placement decisions at all, it is often
the decisive factor.268
Even where the law does not require race-matching preference schemes, the "unwritten rules" and practices of adoption
agencies do require such schemes. 269 Too often, courts are unwilling or unable to second-guess the agencies' decisions. In
Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't of Family and Children's
Services,27o for example, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
recognized that race was "given substantial weight" in an
agency's decision to remove a biracial foster child from the
home of white foster parents who wanted to adopt him. 271
The court held that such consideration was proper as long as it
"was not an automatic-type of thing ... that is, that all blacks
go to black families, all whites go to white families, and all
mixed children go to black families, which would be prohibited.,,272 The Drummond court accepted the trial court's finding
that race was not the only factor in the agency's decision. 273

265. Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? supra note 6, at 1185, n. 56
(citing TASK FORCE ON TRANSRAClAL ADOPl'ION, OFFICE OF POLICY AND MANAGEMENT, COMPREHENSIVE PLANNING DMSION, A STUDY OF TRANSRAClAL ADOPl'ION IN
THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 7, 27 (1988».
266. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8708(a) (West Supp. 1996), supra note 257.
267. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8709 (West Supp. 1996), supra note 261. The Connecticut statute does not contain such a provision. See supra note 260.
268. Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? supra note 6, at 1239.
269. [d. at 1184-1185.
270. Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't of Family and Children's Services, 563
F.2d 1200 (5th Cir. 1977).
271. [d. at 1201, 1203, 1204. They had raised him since he was one month old
and had been excellent parents to him during the three years he was in their
care.
272. [d. at 1204, quoting and approving the trial court's ruling.
273. [d. at 1204.
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Yet, nowhere does the opinion suggest what factors, other than
race, played a role in the agency's decision.274 Allowing agencies and courts to consider race as one of many factors in determining the best interests of the child thus allows the status
quo to continue.
One problem courts face in reviewing adoption and foster
care placement decisions is that it is very difficult if not impossible to know for certain which factors were crucial to a placement decision. 275 Eliminating the use of race as a permissible
factor would eliminate the possibility that race could remain a
decisive factor in practice. Race cannot be the decisive factor if
it cannot be a factor at all.
2. Considering the Child's Existing Bonds With Foster Parents
While failing to adequately protect against the harms of
race-matching, California's new law more effectively addresses
the problems that inhere in a system which removes children
from foster parents or other care-givers by requiring that foster
parents be considered as adoptive parents for the children in
their care. 276 The statute does not require that the foster parents be given preference in placement, only that they be con-

274. [d. at 1219 (Tuttle, J., dissenting). "In any event, there was no record,
there was no transcript of testimony, there is no indication that any word about
other reasons than Timmy's race went into any decision-making ... " [d.
275. Drummond, 563 F.2d at 1219 (Tuttle, J., dissenting).
276. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8710 (West Supp. 1996), enacted with §§ 8708 & 8709,
provides in part:
(T]he foster parent or parents shall be considered with
respect to {placement 00 the child along with all other
prospective adoptive parents where all of the following are
true:
(a) The child has been in foster care with the foster parent or parents for a period of more than four months.
(b) The child has substantial emotional ties to the foster
parent or parents.
(c) The child's removal from the foster home would be
seriously detrimental to the child's well-being.
(d) The foster parent or parents have made a written
request to be considered to adopt .the child.
[d.
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sidered. 277 It does, however, require an assessment of the effect of removal from the foster home on the child in requiring
agencies to consider whether removal will be "seriously detrimental to the child.,,278 It also requires courts to look at the
emotional bonds between the child and the foster parents. 279
It is difficult to see how, after finding that a child has emotional bonds with her foster parents and that removal from the
foster home would be detrimental, an agency could find that
adoption by prospective parents other than the foster parents
would be in the child's best interest.
B. MAINE: EVALUATING EXISTING EMOTIONAL BONDS IN DETERMINING THE CHILD'S BEST INTEREST

Maine has similarly addressed these problems by requiring that courts consider the child's bonds with potential adoptive parents in determining the best interests of the child. 280
Emphasizing these bonds in decisions about adoptive placement would prevent needless trauma to children separated
from loving foster parents in favor of strangers who more nearly match an adoption agency's profile of a proper parent for
that child. 281 Because of the importance of stable relation-

277.
278.
279.
280.

Id.
CAL. FAM. CODE § 8710(d) (West Supp. 1996), supra note 276.
CAL. FAM. CODE § 8710(c) (West Supp. 1996), supra note 276.
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19 § 1129(2) (West Supp. 1997) provides in part:
In detennining the best interests of the adoptee, the court
shall consider and evaluate the following factors to give
the adoptee a permanent home at the earliest possible
date:
(A) The love, affection and other emotional ties existing
between the adoptee and the adopting person or persons,
the birth parent or birth parents or the putative father.

Id.

Foster parents and the children in their care often share emotional bonds.
See supra notes 94-102 and accompanying text.
281. See e.g., In re Jasmon 0., 878 P.2d 1297, 1305 (Cal. 1994), supra notes
118-128 and accompanying text, where the child was so traumatized at the prospect of being separated from her foster parents that she developed a mental illness, called separation anxiety disorder. This case, while illustrative of the problems children face when separated from loving care-givers, dealt with a failed
attempt to reunite the child with her birth father rather than a decision to allow
someone other than her foster parents to adopt her. See also McLaughlin v.
Pernsley, 693 F. Supp. 318, 327 (E.D. Pa. 1988), where a child developed a severe
depression of childhood as a result of being removed from his foster home; and In
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ships in the lives of children, the focus should be on this factor,
rather than on factors which have nothing to do with parenting
ability.
C. MICHIGAN: PROTECTING AGAINST MORE THAN RACIAL

DIS~

CRIMINATION

Michigan amended its adoption laws in 1994 to prohibit
adoption agencies from discriminating against potential adoptive parents on the grounds of age, race, religion, disability, or
income leveL 282 The benefit of such a scheme is that it opens
more potential adoptive homes for waiting children. By providing more placement options, the new law better safeguards the
rights of children to a stable and permanent home.
There are two important reasons to extend adoption reforms beyond race discrimination, as Michigan has done. First
of all, factors such as age, religion, ethnicity, and marital status have little to do with parental fitness. 283 It is equally dev-

re M.D., Jr., 653 A.2d 873, 876-877 (D.C. Ct. App. 1995), where the relationship
that had developed between a foster mother and her 3-year-old foster son was a
factor in the decision to allow her to adopt the child.
282. MICH. COMPo LAwS ANN. § 722.957(1) (West Supp. 1996) provides:
[A]n adoption facilitator shall not refuse to provide services to a potential adoptive parent based solely on age,
race, religious affiliation, disability, or income level. A
child placing agency shall not make placement decisions
based solely on age, race, religious affiliation, disability,
or income level.
[d.
MICH. COMPo LAws ANN. § 722.957(3) (West Supp. 1996) provides:
In an adoption in which a [birth] parent or guardian
selects or participates in the selection of the adoptive
parent, an adoption facilitator shall allow the [birth] parent or guardian the option of selecting from the . . . entire pool of potential adoptive parents who have been
determined suitable to be adoptive parents.
[d.
MICH. COMPo LAws ANN. § 722.957 (West Supp. 1996). See also WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 48.82(5) (West Supp. 1997) (providing that "[a]lthough otherwise qualified,
no person shall be denied the benefits of this section because the person is deaf,
blind or has other physical handicaps."); and CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a727(c)(3) (West 1996) (prohibiting courts from denying adoptions "solely because of
an adopting parent's marital status or because of a difference in race, color or
religion . . . or because the adoption may be subsidized ... ").
283. See Hollinger, supra note 3, at 48, pointing out that such factors "may
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astating for children to be removed from a foster home for permanent placement elsewhere when the reason for the removal
is the foster parent's age or marital status. 2M
A second reason to prohibit the use of discriminatory criteria in adoption placement decisions is the effect of combining
such factors with race-matching. The current law is that race
may be a factor as long as it is not the only factor.285 In cases
where, for example, both race and age are factors, courts may
have no grounds on which to overturn a decision based entirely
on discriminatory factors. In Child v. Stangler, for instance, a
single foster mother challenged a denial of her petition to
adopt her foster daughter.286 Factors in the denial were the
foster mother's race, age, and marital status. 287 The United
States District Court for the Western District of Missouri held
that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the case since there
were clearly grounds for the agency decision other than
race. 288 According to the court, the consideration of the foster

have only questionable relevance to ... parenting skills." See supra part V.C. for
a discussion of the limits of any benefit to screening on the basis of age and marital status. See generally BARTHOLET, FAMILY BONDS, supra note 4.
284. See, e.g., In re Tachick, 210 N.W.2d 865 (Wis. 1973), where the biological
grandparents of a three-year-old boy sought to adopt him. They had cared for him
since birth at the request of the child's birth mother (the birth father was their
son). Id. at 866. The trial court denied the adoption primarily because of the
grandparents' age, although their failure to make sure their eight grown children
finished high school and some possible health problems were also factors. Id. at
869. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reversed, giving decisive weight to the trauma the child would likely suffer if separated from his grandparents, whom he saw
as his parents. Id. at 872.
285. Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? supra note 6, at 1239. See
also McLaughlin v. Pernsley, 693 F. Supp. 318, 321 (E.D. Pa. 1988), where, explaining its decision to overturn a foster care placement decision, the court noted
that "defendants were unable to show that the Department's decision to remove
Raymond Bullard from the McLaughlins was based upon any reason other than
that of race." The McLaughlin court found race was the sole factor, but it is often
difficult to so find. Cf. Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't of Family and
Children's Services, 563 F.2d 1200 (5th Cir. 1977).
286. Child v. Stangler, No. 92-0850-CV-W-6, 1992 WL 396318 (W.D. Mo. Dec.
28, 1992). The case was an equal protection challenge to a state court ruling. Id.
at *1.
287. Id. at *2. The brief opinion did not discuss any evidence of the foster
mother's parenting skills or her relationship with the child. There was also no
mention of how long the child had been in her care.
288. Id. The court explained, however, that she would be able to appeal to the
Missouri state courts. Id. In a footnote which cited McLaughlin v. Pernsley, 693 F.
Supp. 318, (E.D. Pa. 1988), affd 867 F.2d 308 (3d Cir. 1989), infra notes 300-303
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mother's age and single status were enough to defeat her equal
protection claim, which could be sustained only if race were
the only factor in the denial. 289 Thus, consideration of factors
such as age and marital status can defeat a challenge to an
essentially race-based adoption decision.
The Michigan law has two weaknesses, however. First, the
law does not prohibit consideration of these factors; it merely
says they may not be the "sole" reason for a placement decision. 290 This leaves open the possibility that agencies will
continue to use these factors to deny adoptions.291 In spite of
laws on the books giving single adults the right to adopt, agencies regularly deny adoptions based on marital status. 292 Similarly, in spite of adoption laws with no maximum age limit for
adoptive parents, agencies routinely deny adoptions on the
basis of age. 293 As with race, then, an outright prohibition on
considering these criteria is necessary to prevent agencies from
using these discriminatory factors as decisive factors in denying adoptions.
The second weakness in the Michigan law is that it gives
only a finite list of factors which cannot be used to deny an
adoption, rather than eliminating any standards which would
be discriminatory in any area of the law other than adoption.
The law does not address instances where agencies screen out
potential parents because of their marital status or ethnicity,
for example. Such standards can needlessly delay adoption
placements just as much as the factors addressed by the Michigan law. 294 For these reasons, this comment will recommend
and accompanying text, the court suggested the foster mother might be able to
challenge the state court's factual findings that she would be unable to "help the
child learn about her ethnic heritage and culture and give her cultural support" in
a state appeals court. Child, 1992 WL 396318. at *2 and n.3. With the foster
mother's age and marital status remaining as permissible factors, however, it
would be quite possible for such a challenge to result in reversing the trial court's
factual finding on her ability to meet her foster daughter's cultural needs without
reversing the denial of adoption. Her age and marital status would be enough to
support the denial. Id. at *2.
289. Child, 1992 WL 396318 at *2.
290. MICH. COMPo LAws ANN. § 722.957(1) (West Supp. 1996), supra note 282.
291. See supra part VI.A. for a discussion of the ineffectiveness of similar language in statutes meant to limit race-matching.
292. See supra note 8.
293. Id.
294. One agency refused for three years to place Haitian twin babies for adop-
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completely eliminating any discriminatory factors from adoption decisions, and require that courts and agencies focus instead on prospective adoptive parents as individuals.

VII. RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE THE
SCREENING SYSTEM
Children suffer when agencies delay adoptive placements
in the hopes of finding married parents young enough to have
biological children, both of whom are the same race as the
child. They suffer when their emotional bonds with foster parents are severed so agencies can instead place them with
young, married, same-race strangers. 295 They suffer when
they are moved from one foster home to another for many
years and deprived of an opportunity to form parent-child
bonds at all. 296 The current trend towards eliminating the
use of race as the "sole factor" in denying adoptive placements
is a step in the right direction, but it does not adequately protect the interests of children waiting for adoptive homes. Adoption reform laws must completely eliminate any factors which
would be discriminatory in other areas of the law from consideration in adoption placement decisions; otherwise, such factors will continue to be decisive.
This comment recommends that adoption placement decisions be based solely on assessment of the personal qualities
which make for excellent parenting, qualities such as patience,
affection, maturity, and motivation to parent. 297 The focus
should be on the prospective adoptive parents' bonds with the
child they seek to adopt, where possible, both because of the
critical importance of these relationships to the child and because of the opportunity such a focus affords adoption agency
workers to assess the parents' ability to raise the individual
child they seek to adopt. This comment therefore recommends

tion while it searched for Haitian parents who spoke French. Only after three
years did the agency allow an African-American couple who did not speak French
to adopt the twins. Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? silpra note 6, at
1187, n. 60.
295. See supra note 281.
296. See supra notes 148-149.
297. See supra notes 78-85 and accompanying text.
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giving preference to a child's actual care-givers in placement
decisions. This comment further recommends providing a remedy for violations of these standards, which would make the
proposed reforms more effective.
A. A PREFERENCE FOR ACTUAL CARE-GIVERS

A requirement that courts and agencies give priority to
requests by potential adoptive parents who are actual caregivers of the children they seek to adopt would vastly improve
the screening system. 29B The Maine adoption law discussed in
part VI.B. would serve as a model because it specifically mandates consideration of the emotional bonds between children
and potential adoptive parents in determining the ability of
those parents to care for the child. 299 Stability in early childhood is the most significant factor in the success of adoptions. 30o Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has
repeatedly emphasized the importance of these parent-child
bonds when extending constitutional protection for family
relationships.301
Another advantage of priority consideration for actual
care-givers' adoption petitions is that such a practice would
298. This comment refers to actual care-givers as any parents who are already
raising the child they seek to adopt, including foster parents or grandparents or
other relatives. The idea of giving priority to such potential adoptive parents
would be to require agencies to ftrst consider their petitions to adopt before moving on to consider other potential parents.
299. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19 § 1129(2)(A) (West Supp. 1997), supra note
280.
300. Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? supra note 6, at 1224, n. 164
(citing W. FEIGELMAN & A. SILVERMAN, CHOSEN CHILDREN: NEW PATTERNS OF
ADOPTIVE RELATIONSHIPS 92-93 (1983», pointing out that the disruption and discontinuity in the lives of children before they are placed in a permanent adoptive
home are the reason early placement is so important for children's well-being.
301. See, e.g., Lehr v. Robertson 463 U.S. 248 (1983) and Quilloin v. Walcott
434 U.S. 246 (1978) (holding that unwed biological fathers did not have a constitutionally protected interest in maintaining their relationships with children for
whom they took no responsibility); Smith v. Organization of Foster Fatnilies for
Equality and Reform 431 U.S. 816 (1977) (discussing in dicta the importance of
emotional bonds within fatnilies to the constitutional protection of family relationships); Stanley v. lllinois 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (holding it unconstitutional to remove children from an unwed father who had established parent-child bonds with
his children and taken responsibility for their care). See supra Part IV, Constitutional Protection of the Family, for a discussion of this issue.
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give agencies and courts ample evidence with which to assess
parental fitness on an individual basis. When considering the
adoption petition of potential parents who are already caring
for the child they seek to adopt, courts or agencies have before
them evidence of those parents' ability to raise that child. That
is, they have before them evidence of how the child and parents interact, what their relationship is like, and how the child
is developing under their care. Such evidence is not available
in considerations of other potential adoptive parents. Thus,
giving priority consideration to potential adoptive parents
already caring for a child serves the best interest of the child
both by preserving the child's emotional bonds and by allowing
courts and adoption agencies the opportunity to base their
decision on the information most likely to help them accurately
predict successful parenting.
B. AsSESSING PARENTS ONLY AS INDIVIDUALS

Although it is not possible to base an assessment of potential adoptive parents who are not already caring for a child on
their relationship with that child, they too should be assessed
as individuals without regard to discriminatory factors. Some
of these potential adoptive parents may already have children,
in which case adoption agency workers can assess their
parenting ability based on their relationships with these children. 302 Such an inquiry is, of course, not possible for prospective parents seeking to adopt their first child. Many such
prospective parents may, however, have significant contacts
with the children of friends or relatives. Asking about interactions with such children might also give adoption agency workers a picture of the prospective parents' ability to care for a
child of their own. Moreover, personality traits such as warmth
and affection, maturity, and stability are far more important to
a meaningful parent-child relationship than are factors such as
race, marital status or age. 303

302. See, e.g., BURGESS, supra note 80, at 3, telling the story of one adoptive
family with whom she placed a baby boy. Burgess began her investigation of their
parental fitness by visiting the family's home and observing the parents' interactions with their daughter. Id.
303. "Personal qualities of the adoptive parents are of paramount importance;
the age, income and social class are far less important." In re Tachick, 210

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol27/iss2/3

52

Hanan: Adoption Screening Process, Women's Law Forum

1997]

ADOPTION SCREENING PROCESS

219

Race need not be a factor in deciding whether adoptive
parents will be able to meet a child's needs for cultural awareness and positive racial identity. In McLaughlin v. Pernsley,
for example, the Federal District Court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania made an individual assessment of this ability
while hearing a challenge to an agency's decision to remove a
black foster child from the home of a white foster family.304
The McLaughlin court recognized that while the child's severe
depression after being removed from the only home he had
known was a more pressing concern than his racial and cultural needs, an inquiry into the McLaughlins' ability to meet
those needs was nonetheless proper and relevant to the decision. 305 In making such an inquiry, the court determined that
the McLaughlins lived in a racially-integrated neighborhood,
planned to send Raymond to a racially-integrated school, and
would encourage him to learn about his racial heritage and
play with both black children and white children. 306 The
court implied that such an inquiry was to be made regardless
of the race of the foster parents involved. 307 This case demonstrates that courts and agencies can, and sometimes do, assess
potential adoptive parents as individuals. 30B An appropriate

N.W.2d 865, 870, n.7 (Wis. 1973) (citing PRINGLE, ADOPTION FACTS AND FALLACIES:
A REVIEW OF RESEARCH IN THE UNITED STATES, CANADA, AND GREAT BRITAIN
(1968)). See also BURGESS, supra note 80, at 14, noting that the only value of
factors such as age and race to adoption agencies is to "limit the number of applicants."
304. McLaughlin v. Pernsley, 693 F. Supp. 318 (E.D. Pa. 1988), affd, 867 F.2d
308 (3d Cir. 1989). The McLaughlins, a white couple, had cared for a black foster
son, Raymond, since he was five months old. [d. at 319. After the McLaughlins
had cared for Raymond for two years, the agency transferred him to an AfricanAmerican foster family. [d. at 321. Raymond had thrived in the McLaughlins' care
and had developed deep emotional bonds with them. The agency removal was
contrary to the recommendations of Raymond's case worker. [d. at 323. The
McLaughlins challenged the agency's decision on due process and equal protection
grounds. [d. at 319-20.
305. McLaughlin, 693 F. Supp., at 324, 330.
306. [d. at 330.
307. [d. at 324. "This Court, however, does recognize that it must determine
whether foster parents, such as the McLaughlins, can adequately provide for a
foster child's racial and cultural needs." [d. The court gave no indication that such
inquiry need only be made when the foster parents are white. The court cited
evidence that some black parents were not able to provide adequate care to a
child such as Raymond. [d.
308. McLaughlin, at 324. "[T]he use of race as a factor... is not...
'necessary' where a governmental entity such as this Court can make placement
decisions on an individualized basis. [Placement] decisions made under these cir-
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reform statute would limit agencies to consideration of the
personal qualities of individual parents by explicitly prohibiting consideration of race and all other factors which do not
relate to parenting ability. Such a statute might also include
an illustrative list of permissible factors. 309
C. A REMEDY FOR VIOLATIONS
California Assemblyman Goldsmith, who proposed the
amendments to California's adoption law discussed in the
previous section, also proposed providing a remedy for violations of the new Family Code section prohibiting categorically
denying adoptions based solely on race. 310 One benefit is that
a remedy would recognize that the current screening system
does indeed cause harm, and would focus courts' attention on
this harm. As such, the availability of a remedy might change
the result in a case such as Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't
of Family and Children's Services. 311 The Drummond court

cumstances should not be decided by use of pernicious generalizations but rather
should be decided on individual merit." Id. at 324.
In In re Tachick, 210 N.W.2d 865 (Wis. 1973), the Wisconsin Supreme Court
made a similar assessment without regard to the age of the adopting parents. Id.
at 870. The court considered the fact that the child's growth and development
under their care were "beyond average for [his] age." Id. at 872. See also In re
M.D., Jr., 653 A.2d 873 (D.C. Ct. App. 1995), where the court reversed a decision
to deny the petition of a single foster mother to adopt her foster son after reviewing evidence that she had been an excellent mother to the child for the three
years he had been in her care.
309. It would be too rigid to limit agencies to a finite list of characteristics to
consider. "Putting families together in adoption is not a science. It is an art."
BURGESS, supra note 80, at 14. So long as the statute is clear that only factors
which relate directly to parenting ability of the parent as an individual rather
than as a member. of a particular group, the law would serve its purpose.
310. A.B. 1743 § 4, Cal. Leg., 1995-1996 Sess. (1995). The proposed version of
CAL. FAM. CODE § 8708(c) would have provided:
"Any person iJijured by the violation of subdivision (a) by a public or private
adoption agency may bring a civil action against that agency or entity for iJijunctive relief or damages." A.B. 1743 § 4, Cal. Leg., 1995-1996 Sess. (1995). Subdivision (a) contains the provisions against using race as a sole reason for denying or
delaying an adoption. Id.
This proposed statute only would have provided a remedy where race was
the sole factor in denying an adoption. The California reform law it was meant to
enforce only prohibits the use of race as the sole factor in denying adoptions. See
CAL. FAM CODE § 8708 (West SUpp. 1996), supra note 257, and CAL. FAM. CODE §
8709 (West SUpp. 1996), supra note 261.
311. Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't of Family and Children's Services, 563
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ignored not only the emotional bonds that had developed between the child and the foster parents who wished to adopt
him, but also the possibility that the child might be adversely
affected psychologically by the separation from the
Drummonds. 312 Had emotional injury to the child been an
element of the Drummonds' claim, it would have been more
difficult for the court to ignore this possibility.313
Another benefit of such a remedy is that it would give
these laws more bite. An example of the difficulty in implementing reforms of the adoption screening system is the experience of Connecticut. There, an effort at reform was undermined when those charged with implementing a law prohibiting race-based adoption denials proposed a plan for racematching. 314 If a remedy is available, agencies may be more
reluctant to continue using improper criteria in adoptive placement decisions, while courts would be more aware of the issue.
Thus, a remedy would help to effectuate the recommended
reforms.
VIII. CONCLUSION

Families enjoy strong constitutional protection for reasons
other than biological links. Among the reasons for this protection is the importance of the emotional bonds that connect
family members. Preserving such bonds is critical to the emotional well-being of young children. The California courts have
recognized a fundamental right for children to a stable and
secure family where these emotional bonds may be preserved
and have suggested that such a right may be constitutionally
mandated. The current system of screening adoptive parents is

F.2d 1200 (5th Cir. 1977), supra notes 270-275 and accompanying text.
312. [d. at 1208. There was no discussion in the opinion of possible harm to
Timmy, although the independent attorney for the child submitted evidence of
psychological literature proving the "traumatic effect of such moves on young children." [d.
313. The Drummond court did, however, manage to ignore the overwhelming
evidence that race was in fact the sole factor in the decision to deny the
Drummonds' request to adopt, which, even under existing law, was grounds for
reversal. [d. at 1219 (Tuttle, J., dissenting). Therefore, it is far from certain that
stronger laws would prevent any and all Drummond-like rulings.
314. See supra notes 264-265 and accompanying text.
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inconsistent with this protection and with the standard of "the
best interests of the child," which is supposed to be central to
all child placement decisions. Adoption laws which prohibit
consideration of any factors other than the capacity of individual parents to love, nurture, and take care of a child, give
preference to potential adoptive parents who are already taking care of the child, and provide a remedy for violations of
these standards would more adequately protect the interests of
children waiting for adoptive homes.
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